Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Preogative of Executive Privilege by Miller, Randall K.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1997
Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the
Constitutional Preogative of Executive Privilege
Randall K. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Randall K., "Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Preogative of Executive Privilege" (1997). Minnesota Law
Review. 2143.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2143
Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the
Constitutional Prerogative of Executive
Privilege
Randall K. Miller*
[We just simply can't have another Watergate, and another destroyed
administration. So I think the President needs to jettison any thought
of executive privilege.
- Sen. Howard Baker'
IY]ou aren't President; you are temporarily custodian of an institu-
tion, the Presidency. And you don't have any right to do away with
any of the prerogatives of that institution, and one of those is executive
privilege. And this is what was being attacked by the Congress.
- President Ronald Reagan2
In a country where people are presumed innocent, the President isn't.
You've got to go prove your innocence ....
- President Bill Clinton3
* Associate, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP; J.D., George Washington
University Law School, 1996. For their invaluable guidance and personal sup-
port, I wish to pay special thanks to Robert Park, Beth Nolan, and Chip Lupu.
I am also indebted to Harold H. Bruff, Gary R. Greenstein, Edward
Keynes, Dolores Lyons, Christine C. Miller, Theodore B. Olson, Todd D. Pe-
terson, Peter Raven-Hansen, Peter M. Shane, David L. Tubbs, and Colleen
Zack for their assistance and encouragement.
1. 133 CONG. REC. S128 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. How-
ard Baker). Senator Baker's remarks concerned the possible assertion by
President Ronald Reagan of executive privilege during the Iran-Contra inves-
tigation.
2. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Ses-
sion With Reporters, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 390, 392-93 (Mar. 11,
1983). President Reagan was responding to criticisms regarding his assertion
of executive privilege to withhold Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) en-
forcement documents from a House oversight committee.
3. President Bill Clinton, Interview on MTV's "Enough is Enough" Fo-
rum, 30 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 836, 843 (Apr. 19, 1994). President Clin-
ton was justifying his decision to produce documents (over which he might
have claimed a privilege) to an Independent Counsel and Senate committee
investigating Whitewater.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, Congress and the President
have engaged in increasingly bitter constitutional warfare over
access to information. Two implicit constitutional doctrines
have collided in these episodes: executive privilege and con-
gressional investigatory power. The most recent conflict was
sparked by the Clinton administration's May 9, 1996 assertion
of executive privilege to resist disclosure of a small subset of
documents subject to a congressional subpoena. The subpoena
called for materials related to the administration's 1993 firings
of the White House Travel Office staff. A constitutional con-
frontation ensued and, on June 25, 1996, as a result of media
and congressional pressure, the White House surrendered its
claim of executive privilege.4
No Supreme Court decision has attempted to balance the
constitutional claims presented in these disputes although
separately, the Supreme Court has recognized the competing
constitutional doctrines. Congress's constitutional power to in-
vestigate, issue subpoenas, and punish recalcitrant witnesses
has the longer history of Supreme Court recognition dating
from 1821.1 It was not until 1974 that the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged executive privilege as a constitutionally-based pre-
rogative.' Beginning with George Washington, presidents
throughout history have asserted authority to resist congres-
sional requests for information.7 Since 1974, although the D.C.
4- See infra part III.F (discussing the White House Travel Office contro-
versy).
5. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (exploring the Supreme
Court's principal decisions regarding Congress's investigatory power).
6. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). President Nixon
sought to resist disclosure of tape-recorded conversations in a criminal trial
related to the Watergate scandal. Nixon does not involve a congressional de-
mand for information.
7. See, e.g., History of Presidential Invocations of Executive Privilege
Vis-A-Vis Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 751-81 (1982) (Attorney General
memorandum citing examples of invocation of privilege in nearly every ad-
ministration). For example, deciding in 1796 to delay producing documents to
the House of Representatives regarding the Jay Treaty negotiation, President
Washington argued that the success of foreign negotiations "depend[s] on se-
crecy." Id. at 753. Washington did, however, produce these documents to the
Senate in recognition of its constitutional authority to give advice and consent
to treaties. Id.; see also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (listing twenty-seven instances of presidents re-
fusing to comply with congressional requests for information). An early judi-
cial recognition of the privilege and its limits lies in one of John Marshall's
opinions issued while he was riding circuit in 1807. Marshall upheld a sub-
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Circuit Court of Appeals has twice reluctantly considered cases.
involving executive-congressional information disputes,' the
federal courts in the District of Columbia have sought to avoid
these cases and have suggested that the two political branches
have a constitutional obligation to negotiate.9 One prominent
district court opinion, United States v. House of Representa-
tives,10 held that the federal courts should delay adjudication of
congressional-executive information disputes until the officer
asserting executive privilege is criminally prosecuted for con-
tempt of Congress, at which time such official could raise the
privilege as a defense.11
Most congressional requests for executive branch docu-
ments are handled informally and without controversy. The
executive often produces documents over which a privilege
could be asserted, and Congress often defers to the executive
when the latter decides that certain documents should not be
disclosed. 12  Observers have concluded that political negotia-
tion regarding access to information is effective and preferable
poena duces tecum which required President Thomas Jefferson to produce cer-
tain of his personal letters to the court presiding over Aaron Burr's prosecu-
tion for treason. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Gas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d). This decision is the historical antecedent to United States v. Nixon,
i.e., it stands for the proposition that evidence needed by the defense in a
criminal trial can outweigh a presidenfs nondisclosure interests.
8. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (supervising a negotiated settlement that gave a House committee ac-
cess to redacted FBI documents regarding wiretaps); Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(declining to enforce a Senate committee's subpoena for the Watergate tapes).
9. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153
(D.D.C. 1983) (invoking prudential principles of self-restraint to avoid the
merits in a suit brought by the Reagan administration that sought a declara-
tory judgment protecting EPA documents from disclosure by executive privi-
lege); see also United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 395
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (initially declining to reach the merits in a case involving a
congressional subpoena for documents over which President Ford asserted
executive privilege). The court remanded the case with orders that the par-
ties continue to negotiate; on appeal after remand, the court reached the
merits. Id.
10. 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
11. Id. at 153.
12. In other information disputes, the branches clash over statutory
privileges. See generally Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Admin-
istrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 197 (1992) [hereinafter Negotiating for Knowledge] (reviewing some
prominent document disputes that fell short of a constitutional stalemate).
This Article will focus on constitutional disputes that escalate beyond the in-
formal negotiation stage.
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to judicial adjudication. 3 However, once this process escalates
beyond the informal negotiation stage, that is, when Congress
is willing to challenge the President's formal assertion of ex-
ecutive privilege, the President faces insurmountable disad-
vantages and effectively is unable to negotiate with Congress,
even though legitimate justifications for nondisclosure may
exist. The American public intensely distrusts government se-
crecy in the post-Watergate era.14 United States presidents
who have formally battled Congress over access to information
have lost these "negotiations" with investigating committees
and have suffered political injury in the process. The media
play a substantial role in chilling executive privilege, with
headlines and editorials suggesting corruption and cover-up
whenever executive privilege is considered or asserted. The
McCarthy-era forgotten, the media fail to perceive potential
congressional abuse of its investigatory power. This political
climate, coupled with the judiciary's abstention from these
"escalated disputes,"15 has greatly weakened the President's
ability to assert executive privilege.
13. See, e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for
Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 625-31 (1991) (arguing that "the
political process is superior to judicial proceedings," alleging that courts are
"ill-equipped even to define clear standards," cannot discern the "political
needs of Congress for particular documents," and are confined to unimagina-
tive "either-or' solutions"); Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotia-
tion in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against
Congress, 71 M]NN. L. REV. 461, 529 (1987) [hereinafter Legal Disagreement]
(arguing that "negotiations might bog down if the prospect of ultimate resort
to the courts pushes the branches to view their positions as preludes to litiga-
tion rather than as attempts to solve immediate problems reasonably");
Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 12, at 228 (noting that civil
suits "are both time consuming and uncertain" and predicting that courts
would be overly-deferential to the executive branch on matters of national se-
curity and foreign affairs); Joel D. Bush, Note, Congressional-Executive Access
Disputes: Legal Standards and Political Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719, 744-47
(1993) (cautioning that judicial decisions "would set standards for ... future
disputes and thus create disincentives for political compromise").
14. As one state court judge succinctly stated: "Americans hate secrecy,
they detest it, they got rid of a president for it." Michael G. Wagner, Drug
Tests of Racehorses Ordered Released, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 2, 1993, at A6
(statement of Sacramento Superior Court Judge James Ford).
15. I will use the phrase "escalated disputes" to refer to those instances
where each branch has formally asserted a conflicting constitutional entitle-
ment to information, i.e., when a president asserts executive privilege and a
congressional committee has voted for a subpoena duces tecum to compel dis-
closure of executive branch documents.
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This Article argues that United States v. House of Repre-
sentatives was wrongly decided and advocates that federal
court resolution of escalated disputes in a civil proceeding
should be available to either political branch immediately fol-
lowing an assertion of executive privilege coupled with an issu-
ance of a congressional subpoena. Availability of a civil pro-
ceeding in the district court is necessary to fairly safeguard the
legitimate constitutional interests of both branches to access
information. Part I examines Congress's implicit constitu-
tional authority to investigate and compel production of docu-
ments. Part H discusses the constitutionally-based executive
privilege doctrine to protect executive interests, including the
deliberative process, state secrets, law enforcement secrets,
and presidential privacy. Part III summarizes the principal
constitutional battles involving executive privilege since 1973.
Part IV argues that political negotiation in these escalated dis-
putes is constitutionally insufficient and advocates earlier and
more assertive judicial review. Judicial intervention in esca-
lated information disputes is necessary to check frivolous or
unwarranted assertions of executive privilege while simultane-
ously ensuring that executive branch functions are not stifled
or sabotaged by overly-intrusive congressional investigations.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO COMPEL
EXECUTIVE DISCLOSURES
The Constitution does not expressly empower Congress to
compel testimony or the production of documents. In fact, the
Constitution does not even allude to an investigatory function
for Congress. However, as early as 1821, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that Congress possesses implicit constitutional
authority to coerce testimony and to punish recalcitrant wit-
nesses for contempt of Congress. 6 In McGrain v. Daugherty,7
the Supreme Court pronounced that Congress possessed broad
constitutional authority to investigate and induce cooperation.
16. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 219 (1821) (excusing the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives from liability for the arrest
and imprisonment of a Member held in contempt).
17. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). In McGrain, Congress had been investigating
allegations of malfeasance on the part of Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty. The Attorney General was suspected of willfully failing to enforce
federal antitrust statutes. Id. at 151-52. The Supreme Court reversed a dis-
trict court order that had discharged Daugherty's brother from responding to
a Senate committee's subpoena to testify. Id. at 137.
1997] 635
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The Court declared "the power of inquiry-with process to en-
force it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legis-
lative function."18 Thirty years later, in Watkins v. United
States,19 the Court in dicta suggested that Congress's investi-
gation and subpoena power "comprehends probes into depart-
ments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, ineffi-
ciency or waste."20 Many of the Supreme Court's broadest
assertions of congressional investigatory power occur in cases
reviewing McCarthy-era congressional probes into communism
such as those involved in Wilkinson v. United States21 and
Barenblatt v. United States.22 In these cases, the Court refused
to scrutinize the constitutionality of congressional subpoenas
based upon allegations of First Amendment violations or im-
proper legislative motives.23
The Supreme Court has, however, articulated some limits
to Congress's investigatory power. Congressional investiga-
18. Id. at 174.
19. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). In Watkins, the Court invalidated John Wat-
kins's conviction for contempt of Congress. The Court held that the House
Un-American Activities Committee's questions regarding the activities of
Watkins's associates within the Communist party were improper because the
Committee failed to explain the relevance of its inquiry and lacked the
authority to "expose" individuals "for the sake of exposure." Id. at 200. This
suggestion in Watkins that the Court would scrutinize congressional investi-
gations closely, was substantially abandoned in Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959). See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
20. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
21. 365 U.S. 399, 414-15 (1961).
22. 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959) (sustaining defendant's contempt of Congress
conviction.) Lloyd Barenblatt refused to respond to the House Un-American
Activities Committee's 1954 inquiry regarding whether he was a member of
the Communist Party. He unsuccessfully argued that being compelled to an-
swer these questions violated his constitutional right to maintain private po-
litical beliefs. Id.
23. See also Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 455 (applying Baren-
blatt to reject the First Amendment challenge), reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 890
(1961). Like Barenblatt, Frank Wilkinson and Carl Braden were convicted of
contempt of Congress following their refusal to answer questions posed by the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) regarding their alleged
affiliation with the Communist Party. Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 404; Braden,
365 U.S. at 433-34. The complaints of these witnesses similarly fell on deaf
ears. See Alan I. Bigel, The First Amendment and National Security: The
Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist Sympa-
thizers, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 885, 895 (1993) ("Refusing to question the mo-
tives of Congress ... and, after determining that Congress may legislate in
the area of allegedly subversive activity, the Court gave witnesses little hope
of sustaining an objection that questions concerning political beliefs and asso-
ciations were protected under the First Amendment from legislative in-
quiry.").
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tions must be in furtherance of a valid legislative purpose.24
Congress does not possess "the general power of making in-
quiry into the private affairs of the citizen"2 5 and a "mere sem-
blance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry."2 6
However, as many commentators have observed, it is virtually
impossible to successfully challenge the scope of a congres-
sional investigation. 7 Therefore, although the subject of an in-
vestigation must be one "on which legislation could be had,"28
congressional power is "as penetrating and far-reaching as the
potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitu-
tion."29
None of the Supreme Court's cases regarding congres-
sional power to investigate and to compel testimony and the
production of documents involved an assertion of executive
privilege. Hence, the Court's delineation of Congress's investi-
gatory authority may be subject to refinement if an investiga-
tion is shown to conflict with the executive branch's legitimate
constitutional powers. In Barenblatt, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly acknowledged that Congress's power to investigate is
limited by separation of powers considerations. That is, the
power may not be exercised in a way that would prevent a co-
ordinate branch from fulfilling its constitutional functions.
Legislation must be the goal. Therefore, Congress may neither
"inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province"
of the executive branch nor "supplant the executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive."30 Congress's investiga-
tory power, therefore, is not absolute. Rather, as with most in-
stances of governmental power, it must be balanced against
competing constitutional values.
24. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 172 (1927).
25. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880).
26. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957).
27. See, e.g., Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confron-
tations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May En-
force Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U.
L. REV. 71, 75 n.28 (1986) ("lit safely may be said that a modern-day witness
challenging the legitimacy of the congressional objective engages in what is
essentially a fruitless task.'") (citing Arvo Van Alstyne, Congressional Inves-
tigations, 15 F.R.D. 471, 478 (1954)).
28. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177.
29. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); see also East-
land v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (finding
that "the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws").
30. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111-12.
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II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged, for the first time, that executive privilege is a constitu-
tionally-based prerogative. 31 The landmark decision, which
recognized this important executive power, simultaneously de-
livered a fatal blow to the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. In a
unanimous decision, the Court sustained the district court's
order requiring President Nixon to comply with a subpoena
duces tecum and produce tapes containing the President's oval
office conversations with his close advisers. In so doing, the
Court held that President Nixon's general interest in the confi-
dentiality of oval office communications was outweighed by a
"demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
trial."32 The tapes that President Nixon fought so hard to
shield from disclosure proved to contain evidence of the Presi-
dent's cover-up, substantiating his personal culpability in the
Watergate scandal.33 With impeachment looming, the Presi-
dent resigned his office in disgrace on August 8, 1974.31
Over the past two decades mention of executive privilege
has rarely been uttered without simultaneous reference to Wa-
tergate. The American culture's distrust of government and
blood thirst for scandal has contributed to a perceived equiva-
lence between secrecy and camouflage of corruption. The
linking of executive privilege and Watergate are nowhere more
prevalent than on Capitol Hill. A document dispute between
the Clinton administration and a Senate Committee in 1995 is
illustrative. The Special Senate Committee investigating
Whitewater subpoenaed notes taken by a White House attor-
ney during a November 3, 1993 meeting with three other White
31. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
32. Id. at 713.
33. See, e.g., LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 45-46 (1976)
(describing the Watergate special prosecutor's thoughts upon hearing the
tapes for the first time).
34. The infamous Watergate scandal stemmed from the 1972 break-in
and bugging of the Democratic National Committee's headquarters in Wash-
ington, D.C.'s Watergate Hotel by individuals associated with President
Nixon's reelection campaign. The scandal included the subsequent conspiracy
to conceal the break-in and obstruct the investigation, a conspiracy which in-
cluded President Nixon and some of his top advisors. Of the numerous ac-
counts of Watergate, see, for example, STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF
WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIxON (1990); THEODORE H.
WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIxON (1975); BOB
WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESmENT'S MEN (1974); BOB
WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (1976).
[Vol. 81:631638
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House aides and three of President Clinton's personal attor-
neys.35 President Clinton initially asserted attorney-client
privilege, but later produced the documents after Committee
Chairman Alfonse D'Amato threatened to bring a contempt of
Congress resolution to a Committee vote.36 President Clinton's
mere consideration of executive privilege prompted several
Senators to draw comparisons to the Nixon administration,
imputing the Watergate stigma to President Clinton.37
35. Susan Schmidt, White House Rejects Subpoena, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
1995, at Al. The notes were taken by former White House lawyer William
Kennedy HIL. The Committee purportedly sought to assure that confidential
law enforcement information was not improperly passed on to the President's
personal lawyers. I will refer to this dispute as the "Whitewater Notes con-
troversy."
36. Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Notes Being Surrendered, WASH. POST,
Dec. 22, 1995, at Al.
37. The following statements provide examples of the Senators' com-
ments:
[There] is an increasing similarity between this White House and the
Nixon White House.
... I compared some of the arguments that Mr. Clinton has made
with the arguments that Mr. Nixon made in support of Executive
privilege in 1973 and 1974. Now, some have suggested that this is
purely a political exercise. But the fact is, Mr. President, that this is
the first time that such a defense ... has been raised since the Nixon
administration.
Furthermore, this same defense of privilege has been tried and
tested in the courts, and it has failed. The comparison is, therefore,
self-evident, Mr. President, and the exercise rather instructive, giv-
ing all of us an opportunity to examine the reasonableness of the
White House's claim of attorney-client and possibly Executive privi-
lege.
141 CONG. REC. S18,953 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Shelby).
President Nixon... claimed Executive privilege with regard to
the White House tapes and, of course, ultimately saw his claim of
privilege defeated .... So if [President Clinton] is going to assert
greater privilege protection than any of his predecessors, perhaps he
is doing it solely for the purpose of protecting a legal principle. But
the President must understand that the people are going to assume
that there may be other reasons, in light of this country's history.
141 CONG. REc. S18,972 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Thomp-
son).
President Nixon's assertion of executive privilege precipitated a
constitutional crisis that ultimately played a major role in forcing his
resignation. Since that time, Presidents have been extremely cau-
tious in using privilege as a basis for withholding materials from le-
gitimate Congressional inquiries. They have been especially cautious
when this withholding of information might suggest to a reasonable
person that privilege might be being asserted to cloak Presidential or
other high level wrongdoing.
The reason for this caution is clear: relations between the
branches and the people's confidence in their Government suffer
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the rush to raise the specter of Watergate when execu-
tive privilege is mentioned, the constitutional values that led
the Court in Nixon to acknowledge the doctrine's "constitution-
al underpinnings"" tend to be ignored. As a practical matter,
without some degree of executive secrecy, executive functions
would be undermined. For example, if the discharge of an ex-
ecutive duty depends on secrecy, the President's political oppo-
nents in Congress with access to secret information could scut-
tle an operation by a telephone call to the Washington Post. If
the President requires frank advice or confidential information
to make informed decisions, a theory of information sharing
that entitles Congress to every scrap of paper in the White
House would chill sources of information, consequently disa-
bling the President's decision-making process. Unbounded
congressional oversight would stifle, consume, and, ultimately,
supplant executive functions. To micromanage is to aggran-
dize. In a democratic system, members of the executive branch
are accountable, but having to explain to oversight committees
every thought process and utterance has the effect of transfer-
ring executive power to Congress. In fact, Congress's entitle-
ment to information is limited by competing constitutional
principles related to the nature of executive power. The follow-
ing sections will examine four principal interests which execu-
tive privilege may safeguard: (a) the deliberative process; (b)
military and state secrets; (c) law enforcement strategies and
informants; and (d) the President's private affairs.
A. CANDOR AND THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
A basic rationale for executive privilege is that the Presi-
dent requires accurate, frank, and robust advice and informa-
tion from his subordinates, particularly from his close advisers,
in order to perform his constitutional functions. Executive
privilege is a necessary prerequisite to securing that advice
and information. As the Court stated in Nixon: "Human expe-
rience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of
their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for ap-
greatly when the President gives the appearance of withholding in-
formation in order to protect himself or others close to him from pub-
lic scrutiny of potential wrongdoing.
141 CONG. REc. S18,980 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abra-
ham).
38. United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); see also Association
of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(discussing the President's "Article II right to confidential communications").
[Vol. 81:631640
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pearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decision-making process."39 This utilitarian rationale combines
with separation of powers concerns when the communication at
issue involves the President's top advisors.40 In a recent D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion regarding First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton's Task Force on Health Care, the court ob-
served that the Constitution's Framers contemplated confi-
dentiality as indispensable to the exercise of executive power.
41
According to the court, the Framers vested the power of the
presidency in a solitary person "for the very reason that he
might maintain secrecy in executive operations."42 Secrecy en-
ables a president to "deliberate in confidence," which in turn
enables a president to "decide and to act quickly-a quality
lacking in the government established by the Articles of Con-
federation."43 Some degree of executive privilege also enables
high executive branch officials to maintain the appropriate
level of "fearlessness" that is expected of them" and avoid the
inclination to consult an attorney each time the President solic-
its their opinion.45
B. MILITARY AND STATE SECRETS
In Nixon, the Court stated that when claims of executive
privilege are based upon a "need to protect military, diplo-
matic, or sensitive national security secrets"46 the claim of
39. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
40. "Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to
derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of
constitutional duties." Id.
41. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 909.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 (1982) (recognizing the
"public interest in providing an official 'the maximum ability to deal fearlessly...
with' the duties of his office" (citations omitted)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting dangers inherent in public officials fearing law-
suits).
45. As the Court stated in Harlow: "[Tlhe danger that fear of being sued
will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties'" imposes sub-
stantial social costs. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregorie v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). These costs include "the diversion of official en-
ergy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from ac-
ceptance of public office." Id.
46. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
1997]
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privilege should be given "utmost deference."47 An assertion of
executive privilege based upon military or diplomatic informa-
tion is analogous to the common law state secrets doctrine,48
which cedes to the government an absolute privilege to resist
discovery of information in a civil suit if the government dem-
onstrates "a reasonable danger that [discovery] of the evidence
will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged."4 9 The state secrets privilege
need not be asserted by the President himself. In United
States v. Reynolds, ° the Court stated that assertion of the state
secrets doctrine merely requires "a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over
the matter, after actual personal consideration by that offi-
cer."5' The Court further stated that "the circumstances of the
case" may indicate to the judge that it would be inappropriate
to insist "upon an examination of the evidence, even by the
judge alone, in chambers."52
In contrast to the state secrets doctrine, executive branch
policy since 1969 provides that the President himself must as-
sert executive privilege.53 A presidential assertion of executive
privilege, when compared with a state secrets privilege as-
serted by a cabinet officer, presents a stronger executive
47. Id. at 710.
48. See generally James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 875, 876 (1966) (indicating that the state secrets privilege and executive
privilege rest on similar policies).
49. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
50. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
51. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 10. Reynolds involved the crash of an Air Force B-29 aircraft
and subsequent suit by survivors of the crash victims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The survivors sought production of an Air Force accident report
and statements of surviving crew members, which the United States success-
fully opposed. Id. at 2-3.
53. Memorandum from President Nixon for the Heads of Executive De-
partments and Agencies, Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with
Congressional Demands for Information (Mar. 24, 1969), reprinted in Execu-
tive Privilege-Secrecy in Government: Hearings on S. 2170, S. 2378, S. 2420
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. 207 (1975); Memorandum from President Ronald
Reagan for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, On Procedures
Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov. 4,
1982), reprinted in HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE WITHHOLDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM CONGRESS IN 1982-83, H.R. REP. No.
99-435, at 1106 (1985); see Shane, Legal Disagreement, supra note 13, at 482(outlining presidential policies regarding executive privilege).
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branch plea for nondisclosure because it is buttressed by
greater political accountability. At the same time, however, a
congressional request for information is substantially stronger
than is a request by private litigants in light of Congress's con-
stitutional prerogatives in diplomatic and military matters.5 4
The executive branch also has a long practice of providing sen-
sitive national security information to select congressional
committees such as the Senate Intelligence and Armed Service
Committees.5  Nevertheless, the executive's Article II respon-
sibilities56 and the Supreme Court's many acknowledgments of
the executive's special role in controlling diplomatic57 and na-
54. For examples of congressional powers in this area, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("provide for the common defense"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11 ("declare war"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, ("raise and support armies");
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 ("provide and maintain a navy"); U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution" Congress's enumerated
powers).
55. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, Why Not Executive Sessions?, WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 1991, at A23 (noting that the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services
committees have a good record of conducting "leakproof" hearings in executive
session on sensitive diplomatic and national security topics, for example, sup-
port for the Nicaraguan contras and consent to the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty).
56. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 (serve as "Commander in
Chief'); U.S. CONST. art. 17, § 2, cl. 2 (make treaties and appoint ambassadors
"with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"); U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3 (receive
ambassadors); U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 3 ("take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
57. The Supreme Court has firmly established that the President alone
has the power to recognize foreign states. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) ("Political recognition is exclusively a
function of the Executive."). The recognition power has been used as a
springboard to justify the Presidenfs constitutional authority to: (1) terminate
treaties, see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating "[aibrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a
necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government"); and
(2) enter into unilateral executive agreements, especially in 'the context of
claims settlements with foreign states.), see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) ("The President does have some measure of power to
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of
the Senate."). See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1942)
(same); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (same).
Avoiding premature disclosure of diplomatic secrets (unrelated to military
matters) also serves important executive interests. One can imagine scenar-
ios where a foreign government would be unwilling to negotiate with the
United States unless that state could be assured that its secrets would not be
aired on Capitol Hill or, derivatively, in the U.S. media.
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tional security information58 suggest that some level of execu-
tive secrecy in this area, free from congressional oversight, is
constitutionally required. Premature disclosure to Congress
may compromise ongoing military operations or nullify secrecy
agreements with foreign governments necessary to pursue na-
tional interests. 9 Presidents have, with impunity, claimed
constitutional authority to ignore statutory disclosure re-
quirements if "national security" so requires.60 Members of
Congress have been most deferential to claims of executive
privilege in this area.6 1 The executive branch has the institu-
58. See, e.g., Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) ("[The
President's] authority to classify and control access to information bearing on
national security... flows primarily from [the Commander-in-Chief Clause]
and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant."); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("[It is the constitutional duty of the executive-as a matter of sovereign pre-
rogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law... to protect the
confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of inter-
national relations and national defense."); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Water-
man S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both as Com-
mander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available
intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to
the world."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320(1936) (recognizing "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations").
59. In 1980, for example, President Carter enlisted the assistance of Can-
ada in smuggling six U.S. hostages out of Iran. Canada conditioned its assis-
tance on President Carter's promise that he would not inform Congress of
Canada's participation. See Marshall Silverberg, The Separation of Powers
and Control of the CIA's Covert Operations, 68 TEX. L. REV. 575, 614 (1990)(suggesting that the operation was clearly to our nation's benefit and that
Canada rationally "feared having its own Embassy in Tehran laid siege, as our
own had been, if its assistance became known") (citation omitted).
60. For example, in signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, President George Bush stated:
Several provisions in the Act requiring the disclosure of certain in-
formation to the Congress raise constitutional concerns. These pro-
visions cannot be construed to detract from the Presidentfs constitu-
tional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could
significantly impair foreign relations, the national security, the delib-
erative processes of the executive, or the performance of the execu-
tive's constitutional duties.
Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1137 (Aug. 14, 1991).
61. For example, after some initial grumbling, Congress did not challenge
President Clinton's April 16, 1996 assertion of privilege to shield a White
House report regarding weapons shipments from Iran to the Bosnian Muslims
during the 1992-95 Balkans war. For background and analysis of this matter,
see, for example, John Stewart, Defusing Bosnian Time Bombs, S.F. CHRON.,
May 12, 1996, at 20; Tim Weiner, Congress Is Denied Report on Bosnia, N.Y.
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tional advantages of "decision, activity, secrecy, and dis-
patch,"' which have enabled it, in practice, to take the leading
role in diplomatic and military matters.63 The ability to keep
some secrets, even from congressional intelligence committees,
at times may be indispensable to the executive's performance
of these functions.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES AND SECRETS
Attorney General William French Smith and other Justice
Department officials thoughtfully articulated many of the
theories of executive privilege as it relates to protecting the ex-
ecutive branch's law enforcement functions during the Ann
Gorsuch/Burford information dispute.' Permitting expansive
congressional access to law enforcement materials, particularly
active files, threatens to compromise ongoing criminal investi-
gations and would advantage criminal defendants by revealing
the prosecution's strategies, legal analysis, potential witnesses,
and settlement considerations. 6 Broad congressional author-
ity to compel disclosure of investigation files would chill the
government's sources of information.66 Disclosure of certain
TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1996, at Al; Richard Whittle, Clinton Aide Admits U.S. Let
Iran Send Bosnia Arms, DALL. MORN. NEws, Apr. 24, 1996, at 1A.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
63. As the Court stated in Curtiss-Wright:
[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of informa-
tion. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of
harmful results. Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first Presi-
dent refused to accede to a request to lay before the House of Repre-
sentatives the instructions, correspondence and documents relating
to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty-a refusal the wisdom of which
was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
64. See infra Part MI.D (discussing the Anne Gorsuch/Burford contro-
versy).
65. See Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to John D.
Dingell, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in COM-
MITTEE ON PUBLIC WoRmS AND TRANSPORTATION, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS,
H.R. REP. No. 97-968, attach. A, at 78 (1982) (expressing the view that the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations should cease actions to
compel the EPA to produce sensitive documents contained in open law en-
forcement files) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT ON THE BURFORD CONTROVERSY].
66. Id. at 79.
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documents threatens to reveal sensitive law enforcement
techniques, compromise the privacy rights of innocent parties
whom law enforcement materials may reference, and bias a
subsequent prosecution with pre-prosecution publicity." After
a case is closed, many of these interests diminish, but concerns
regarding innocent parties and informants persist. 8 Hence,
some level of secrecy is necessary to enable the executive
branch to prosecute crimes against the United States effec-
tively, a central component of the President's constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws.69
D. PRESIDENTIAL PRIVACY
Quite apart from the executive prerogative to resist de-
mands for information in order to protect institutional inter-
ests, presidents may claim privileges to protect a sphere of per-
sonal privacy regarding diaries, private letters, and other
intimate communications. In Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services,"0 the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged
that presidents, like all citizens, have a constitutionally-based
right to privacy.71 The Court upheld a provision of the Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act which
authorized the Administrator of General Services, an executive
officer, to review President Nixon's presidential materials "for
the purpose of returning to [him] such of them as are personal
and private in nature," and establishing procedures to allow
public access to the rest. 2 "Private" information includes per-
sonal and family finances" and "communications between [the
President] and, among others, his wife, his daughters, his
physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, as well
as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal files."74
67. Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhe-
sive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 337, 366 (1993).
68. Id. at 367.
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
70. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
71. The Court stated: "[P]ublic officials, including the President, are not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal
life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity." Id. at 457.
72. Id. at 436. In the case of former President Nixon, this document col-
lection constituted some "42 million pages of documents and 880 tape record-
ings" of which only a tiny fraction, President Nixon conceded, were private.
Id. at 459.
73. Id. at 457.
74. Id. at 459.
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The Court recognized that even a single document may
"intermingle" private and public communications .7 The Court
upheld the statute because of its sensitivity to the President's
"legitimate privacy interests" and the "limited intrusion of the
screening process."76  The Court's acknowledgment that the
President retains this constitutional right to privacy suggests
that Congress's ability to regulate and access the President's
purely private materials is not absolute; it must be balanced
against the President's legitimate expectation of privacy."7
The Court's opinion in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Service also suggests that a president may be entitled to assert
various common law relationship-based privileges, such as at-
torney-client, spousal, physician-patient, or priest-penitent, to
resist congressional demands for information. In a few district
court cases involving the assertion of such privileges to resist
congressional inquiries, the courts have held that congres-
75. The difficulty of discerning the boundary between the private and
public President was illustrated during the Whitewater Notes controversy
where critics of the President argued that he could not claim attorney-client
privilege regarding the meeting notes because government-paid lawyers/aides
attended the meeting. Susan Schmidt, White House Eases Stance on Notes:
Whitewater Panel Acts to Enforce Subpoena, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1995, at
Al.
In letters to the Whitewater Committee, White House counsel and the
Clintons' personal attorneys argued that because Whitewater affected the
Presidentfs personal and official persona simultaneously, attorney-client con-
fidentiality applied to communications between government and personal
lawyers to share information and allocate responsibilities. Additionally, the
attorneys asserted "common interest privilege," which permits counsel for cli-
ents with a common interest to exchange information without waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege. Without these protections, counsel concluded, President
and Mrs. Clinton would be denied effective assistance of counsel. See gener-
ally Letter from Jane C. Sherburne, Special Counsel to the President, to Al-
fonse M. D'Amato, Chairman, Senate Special Committee Investigating
Whitewater (Dec. 12, 1995) (on file with author); Submission of David E. Ken-
dall, et al. of Williams & Connelly, Attorneys for the President and Mrs. Clin-
ton, to Senate Special Committee Investigating Whitewater (December 12,
1995) (on file with author).
76. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services., 433 U.S. 425,465 (1977).
77. In United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1990), dis-
trict judge Harold H. Greene reviewed in camera portions of President Ronald
Reagan's diary and ordered certain of them to be produced. President Reagan
did not formally assert a privilege in the case. The court, anticipating the po-
tential claim, implied that it would balance the Presidengfs interests against
the need for information in a criminal trial as did the Supreme Court in
Nixon, stating, "If at or prior to the deadline specified above, the former
President asserts the doctrine of executive privilege as a method of opposing
the disclosure of these diary entries, or any of them, the Court will follow the
procedures employed in United States v. Nixon." Id. at 141.
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sional investigations must respect these privileges." Congress
has not attempted, by statute, to proscribe the assertion of
these privileges to investigating committees. The statute clos-
est to this question provides that no person may assert a
privilege to resist a congressional subpoena on the grounds
that cooperation with Congress might "disgrace" the person "or
otherwise render him infamous." 9 Commentators have sug-
gested that the nature of the traditional privileges requires ab-
solute protection and that courts should not subject them to a
balancing test, as they do other claims of executive privilege.80
Other commentators have observed that, in reality, congres-
sional investigatory power effectively trumps such privileges
when the President asserts them.81
It is unclear whether privileges related to presidential pri-
vacy should be viewed as a subset of executive privilege or
evaluated separately. The very unique and public nature of
the presidency suggests that presidents have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy compared to private citizens and, perhaps,
non-absolute protection for special relationship-based commu-
nications. Nevertheless, these interests may not be ignored.
As with the executive's institutional interests in secrecy, the
78. United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 610 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp.
233, 234-35 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1954); see also Jonathan P. Rich, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Con-
gressional Investigations, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 145, 167 nn.159-60 (1988).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1995) provides in full:
No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce
any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either House of
Congress, or by any joint committee established by a joint or concur-
rent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of
either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his
production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise ren-
der him infamous.
80. According to one commentator:
While the attorney-client privilege is often justified on utilitarian
grounds, courts seldom engage in particularized balancing of the in-
terests involved in a specific case .... The requirement of unimpaired
access to legal counsel is no less compelling for parties summoned be-
fore congressional committees, whose investigatory powers are often
directed at potentially criminal activities ....
Rich, supra note 78, at 168 n.162.
81. Commenting on the Whitewater notes controversy in December 1995,
Professor Tiefer argued that the episode "once again dramatically illustrated
how congressional investigations can obliterate legal privilege claims." Charles
Tiefer, Oversight; Privilege Pushover; Congressional Investigations Can Oblit-
erate Legal Privilege Claims, TEX LAW., Jan. 15, 1996, at 28.
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President's privacy interests must, at a minimum, be balanced
against countervailing public interests in disclosure.
I. CASE STUDIES
Below are summaries of the significant information dis-
putes between the executive and Congress since 1973 in which
Congress challenged an assertion of executive privilege. These
were the exceptional cases where Congress and the President
locked horns at the constitutional level over access to informa-
tion. Each summary provides (i) the purported congressional
interest in its investigation, (ii) the executive's justification for
its claim of privilege, and (iii) the final resolution. The case
studies show that a sufficiently motivated Congress may in-
tensify the controversy by taking a series of actions to obtain
executive branch documents notwithstanding a claim of execu-
tive privilege. The Gorsuch/Burford controversy, 82 for example,
proceeded through each of these stages: (1) informal demand;
(2) informal negotiation; (3) subcommittee votes to subpoena;
(4) subcommittee delivers the subpoena; (5) subcommittee
votes to hold in contempt; (6) subcommittee recommends con-
tempt citation to full committee; (7) full committee votes to
hold in contempt; (8) full committee recommends contempt ci-
tation to full House; (9) full House votes for contempt; (10) the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House certifies
the contempt citation to the appropriate U.S. attorney "whose
duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury" to
obtain criminal indictment. 83
As Congress escalates the confrontation, executive officials
often will produce more of the sought-after information or will
propose secured viewing procedures. For example, officials
might propose that members of Congress may examine repre-
sentative documents, but may not remove the documents from
executive branch offices, photocopy them, or take notes, etcet-
era.8 Simultaneously with or alternatively to the actions
82. See infra Part I.D (discussing the Anne Gorsuch/Burford contro-
versy).
83. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1995). See infra notes 220-234 and accompanying text
for an expanded discussion of the statutory mechanism for contempt of Con-
gress.
84. See Philip Shabecoff, Data That Caused Citing of Watt Will Be Pro-
vided to House Group, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1982, at A21 (summarizing secu-
rity measures imposed on subcommittee members viewing Department of In-
terior documents which President Reagan believed contained sensitive
diplomatic information); see also Peterson, supra note 13, at 626-28
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listed above, Congress may employ its other, more draconian,
powers to induce executive compliance: it can fail to fund pro-
grams which are the subject of an investigation, it can fail to
act on an executive nominee, or it can expand the level of con-
gressional attention (and, hence, public visibility) over an in-
quiry, for example, by establishing a special investigating
committee. Members of Congress can call for an Independent
Counsel to probe the underlying matter or to investigate the
propriety of the executive privilege assertion itself. Ultimately,
Congress can threaten, or actually initiate, impeachment pro-
ceedings. 85
A. RICHARD NIXON AND THE WATERGATE TAPES (1973-1974)
In 1973, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities sought to compel disclosure of the Water-
gate tapes 6 The Committee was created to investigate alle-
gations of illegal and unethical conduct during the 1972 presi-
dential election and to determine whether new legislation to
safeguard the presidential election process was necessary.
87
The Committee first made an informal request and subse-
quently issued two subpoenas duces tecum, both of which
President Nixon rebuffed.8 Rather than seeking a contempt
citation or ordering the "Sergeant-at-Arms to forcibly secure
attendance of the offending party," 9 which the Committee
thought was "inappropriate and unseemly,"" the Committee
brought suit in the district court for a declaration that the sub-
poena was valid. The Committee also asked the district court
(describing the progression of the accommodation process); Shane, Legal
Disagreement, supra note 13, at 515 (same).
85. Impeachment is Congress's ultimate and unreviewable check against
the other branches of national government. See infra note 207 and accompa-
nying text (discussing congressional authority to impeach executive and judi-
cial officers).
86. These were the same tape recordings of President Nixon with his
aides sought by the grand jury in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973), and by the House Watergate Committee.
87. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
366 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1973). "[President Nixon]'s sole response con-
sisted of a letter to Select Committee Chairman Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
expressing the Presidentfs intention not to comply with the subpoenas .... "
Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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for a writ of mandamus ordering President Nixon to comply.9
The district court dismissed the case for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.92
Congress then passed a statute "placing special jurisdic-
tion in [the district court] to enforce the Committee's subpoe-
nas."93 President Nixon sent a letter to the district court argu-
ing that the case was not justiciable and, in the alternative,
that "publication of all of these tapes to the world at large
would seriously infringe upon the principle of confidentiality,
which is vital to the performance of my Constitutional respon-
sibilities," and would also adversely affect "ongoing and forth-
coming criminal proceedings."94 The district court employed a
balancing test which sought to "weigh the public interests pro-
tected by the President's claim of privilege against the public
interests that would be served by disclosure to the Committee
in this particular instance."95 The district court struck the bal-
ance in President Nixon's favor, in part because of the poten-
tial risk of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The court stated:
The Committee's role as a "Grand Inquest" into governmental mis-
conduct is limited, for it may only proceed in aid of Congress' legisla-
tive function. The Committee has, of course, ably served that func-
tion over the last several months, but surely the time has come to
question whether it is in the public interest for the criminal investi-
gative aspects of its work to go forward in the blazing atmosphere of
ex parte publicity directed to issues that are immediately and inti-
mately related to pending criminal proceedings. The Committee it-
self must judge whether or not it should continue along these lines of
inquiry, but the Court, when its equity jurisdiction is invoked, can
and should exercise its discretion not to enforce a subpoena which
would exacerbate the pretrial publicity in areas that are specifically
identified with pending criminal charges. 96
91. Id.
92. Id. at 61.
93. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
370 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D.D.C.), affd, 498 F.2d 725 (1974). President Nixon
did not attempt to veto this resolution. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
94. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
370 F. Supp. at 524-25.
95. Id. at 522.
96. Id. at 524; cf Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92, 295
(1929) (holding that Congress may require pertinent disclosures even if the
sought-after information could be used in pending litigation), overruled by
United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling.97 The court reaffirmed its prior ruling that
"presidential communications are 'presumptively privileged.'""8
The presumption could be overcome "only by a strong showing
of need by another institution of government-a showing that
the responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be
fulfilled without access to records of the President's delibera-
tions."99 In concluding that the Committee failed to demon-
strate that the sought-after information was "critical" to the
Committee's function, the Court emphasized that the Commit-
tee's investigation substantially overlapped that of the House
impeachment committee which already had access to the
sought-after tapes.'00
The court also justified its decision on the basis of the dif-
ference between Congress and a grand jury; the former
"frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information,"
whereas the latter must "determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not
commit specific crimes." 10' Because the Committee could point
"to no specific legislative decisions that cannot responsibly be
made without access to materials," the court concluded that the
Committee's claim was "too attenuated and too tangential to
its functions to permit a judicial judgment that the President is
required to comply with the Committee's subpoena."02 Presi-
dent Nixon won this battle; however, he lost the presidency,
resigning from office less than three months later.
B. AT&T AND FBI WIRETAPS (1976-1977)
In 1976, the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce is-
sued a subpoena to AT&T to produce Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) "request letters" (letters from the FBI to AT&T
97. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 730.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 732.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 733. This decision suggests that the authority of a congres-
sional committee to subpoena information may be somewhat curtailed if an
Independent Counsel is concurrently conducting an overlapping investigation.
See infra notes 264-279 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of an
Independent Counsel investigation on the scope of congressional power to
subpoena executive branch documents).
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requesting wiretapping assistance). The Subcommittee's pur-
ported legislative interest was to determine the "extent of war-
rantless wiretapping in the United States for asserted national
security purposes" and contemplate limiting legislation to
safeguard individual privacy. 03 The Justice Department and,
later, President Ford opposed AT&T's compliance with the
Committee's subpoena.104 The President was concerned that
disclosure of surveillance targets outside of Congress would
harm diplomatic relations with nations whose nationals have
been monitored, disclose U.S. intelligence secrets, and poten-
tially threaten the lives of U.S. intelligence agents. 05
The executive branch offered to produce "expurgated cop-
ies of the backup memo pertaining to foreign intelligence taps,
with all information which would identify the target replaced
by generic description."06 Negotiations between the Commit-
tee and the President broke down over verification proce-
dures.10 7 The Justice Department brought suit to enjoin
AT&T's compliance with the subpoena. The district court en-
joined AT&T's compliance.0 8 Purporting to balance the re-
spective interests of the political branches, the district court
ultimately ceded to the executive branch authority to make the
"final determination" since the Constitution entrusts the ex-
ecutive with the "primary role" in areas of national security. 109
The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, ordering the parties
to continue to negotiate. 10 The court characterized the case as
a "clash of absolutes;""1 both parties had asserted "patently
conflicting assertions of absolute authority" and complete im-
munity from judicial review.1"
103. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 385 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 387.
105. Id. at 388.
106. Id. at 386.
107. Id. at 387.
108. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.
1976).
109. Id. at 461.
110. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d at 395.
11L Id. at 391.
112. Id. Congress based its absolute claim upon the Speech or Debate
Clause. Id. The executive's absolute claim was grounded on its inherent con-
stitutional authority "to assure secrecy of sensitive national security informa-
tion." Id. at 393.
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After rejecting the absolute nature of the claims, the court
recognized that it would face "severe problems" if it attempted
to resolve "such nerve center constitutional questions.""3  In
remanding the case, the court offered some of its "own reflec-
tions" which it hoped would "be of some assistance" to contin-
ued negotiations, including an offer to review documents in
camera to verify the accuracy of the executive's generic de-
scriptions, and an expression of concern that security problems
would be magnified if the documents were made available to
all 435 members of the House.' 14 The circuit court ordered the
district court to report on progress of negotiations within three
months. On appeal after remand, 115 the court ordered a verifi-
cation procedure similar to the Justice Department's final offer
that would allow Subcommittee members to examine ten unex-
purgated documents selected at random."6 The court observed
that the additional negotiation period "narrow[ed] the gap be-
tween the parties and provide[d] a more informed basis" for the
now necessary judicial resolution of the dispute."17 The D.C.
Circuit in AT&T seems to have devined a constitutional re-
quirement for the branches to negotiate and a role for the fed-
eral courts to facilitate the negotiation process and, if neces-
sary, order the final compromise.
C. JAMES WATT AND CANADIAN LAND LEASES (1981-1982)
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce's Over-
sight and Investigations Subcommittee sought to compel the
production of documents from the Department of the Interior
under then Secretary James Watt."' The documents related to
113. Id. at 394.
114. Id. at 394-95.
115. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
116. Shane, Legal Disagreement, supra note 13, at 474-75.
117. 567 F.2d at 130. The court explained:
The simple fact of a conflict between the legislative and executive
branches over a congressional subpoena does not preclude judicial
resolution .... Where the dispute consists of a clash of authority be-
tween two branches... judicial abstention does not lead to orderly
resolution of the dispute .... If negotiation fails ... a stalemate will
result, with the possibility of detrimental effect on the smooth func-
tioning of government.
Id. at 126.
118. William Chapman, Hill Panel Votes to Cite Watt for Contempt, WASH.
POST, Feb. 26, 1982, at Al. See generally Contempt of Congress: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations [ofi the House Comm. on
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Canada's energy policy, which was alleged to discriminate
against oil companies in the United States. 119 The Committee
wanted to know whether Watt should invoke the reciprocity
provisions under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which would
deny federal oil and gas leases to Canada if it was not provid-
ing equal opportunities to American companies.120 Watt was
called to testify before the Committee and asked to produce
relevant documents. 121 He produced approximately 200 docu-
ments but withheld others, which Watt said he would not pro-
duce pursuant to an order from President Reagan, who as-
serted executive privilege."2
President Reagan purportedly sought to protect sensitive
cabinet level deliberations and avoid premature disclosure of
foreign policy deliberations which could compromise ongoing
diplomatic relations with Canada. In a letter to Watt, Presi-
dent Reagan stated: "It is my decision that you should not re-
lease these documents, since they either deal with sensitive
foreign policy negotiations now in process or constitute mate-
rials prepared for the Cabinet as part of the Executive Branch
deliberative process through which recommendations are made
to me."123 In a letter to President Reagan recommending the
assertion of executive privilege, Attorney General William
French Smith emphasized the "deliberative, predecisional"
character of the documents, which included preliminary drafts
of Secretary Watt's congressional testimony. 24 The Attorney
General cautioned that disclosure to Congress would threaten
the executive branch's decision-making process by causing
"officials to modify policy positions that they would otherwise
espouse because of actual, threatened, or anticipated congres-
sional reaction."12 Negotiation between the branches, Smith
concluded, should be "a principled effort to acknowledge, and if
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 104 (1981-1982) (detailing the Subcommit-
tee's hearings and efforts to force Secretary Wats compliance); Shane, Legal
Disagreement, supra note 13, at 501-08 (same).
119. Martha M. Hamilton, Executive Privilege Invoked to Back Watt,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1981, at D12.
120. Id.
121. William Chapman, House Subcommittee Votes to Cite Watt for Con-
tempt, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1982, at Al.
122. Id.
123. Hamilton, supra note 119, at D12.
124. Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to President
Ronald Reagan (Oct. 13, 1981), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 97-898, at 42-56
(1982).
125. Id.
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possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other Branch"
rather than "an exchange of concessions or a test of political
strength."2 6 Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk
of the House of Representatives, characterized Smith's letter as
containing "baseless conclusions," "unsup-ported by any cita-
tion of authority," which, if taken to their logical conclusions,
would shelter from Congress all materials in the executive
branch. 127
Members of the media perceived that President Reagan
lacked any viable justification for his claim of executive privi-
lege. 28 Legal experts who testified before the Committee com-
pared President Reagan's assertion of executive privilege to
that of President Nixon during Watergate. 29  After negotia-
tions failed, the Subcommittee subpoenaed the remaining
documents. 130 Subsequently, the Subcommittee,13 1 then the full
Committee, 132 voted to hold Watt in contempt. One day before
the full House vote, the White House surrendered its claim of
executive privilege and allowed Subcommittee members to re-
view the remaining documents with restrictions: the docu-
ments were made available for four hours during which mem-
bers of the Subcommittee (not staff) could review them and
take notes, but executive officials retained custody.3 3  Not-
withstanding the security procedures, Representative Marc L.
Marks, the ranking Republican on the Subcommittee, de-
scribed the agreement as a "capitulation."134 The Watt episode
126. Id.
127. Memorandum from Stanley Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk,
U.S. House of Representatives, to John Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 10, 1981),
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 97-898, at 48-56 (1982).
128. For example, the New York Times stated:
Judging from some of the documents initially withheld but later re-
leased, the executive claims seem overblown. One legal memo turned
out to be by a summer clerk. No documents ever reached the Presi-
dent's desk. Their compromise hardly impairs the ability of the
White House to function, but Congress will be stymied if such
sweeping executive privilege claims prevail.
Editorial, Privilege and Secretary Watt, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1982, at A16.
129. REUTERS LTD. INTL NEws, Nov. 13, 1981.
130. House Panel Subpoenas Watt for Data on Leasing Policy Toward
Canada, PLATT's OILGRAM NEws, Oct. 6, 1981, at 4.
131. Chapman, supra note 121, at Al.
132. Chapman, supra note 118, at Al.
133. Philip Shabecoff, Data That Caused Citing of Watt will be Provided to
House Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1982, at A21.
134. Id.
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is the first of a modern trend in which Presidents assert ex-
ecutive privilege and, subsequently, are forced to capitulate
under political pressure.
D. ANN GORSUCH/BURFORr AND EPA ENFORCEMENT OF
SUPERFUND (1982-1983)
The Gorsuch/Burford controversy produced the most pro-
tracted and bitter executive privilege-congressional investiga-
tion battle to date. 35 The controversy had at its center then
EPA Administrator Anne M. Gorsuch (who, in the midst of this
controversy married, and changed her last name to Burford).'36
In the fall of 1982, several separate House subcommittees
sought information regarding the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) enforcement of Superfund violations . 3 7 The
investigations were initially prompted by concerns that the
new Reagan administration was soft on environmental en-
forcement.1 38 As the controversy progressed, the committees
probed allegations that the $1.6 billion Superfund program (to
abate hazardous waste), under the direction of Rita M. Lavelle,
had been mismanaged and politically manipulated. 139  Sub-
committees of both the House Public Works and Transporta-
tion Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee re-
quested, then subpoenaed, EPA enforcement documents.140
Ms. Burford, on orders from President Reagan, invoked execu-
tive privilege to resist disclosure of fewer than a hundred re-
sponsive documents.141 The White House argued that disclo-
135. For an overview of this dispute, see Ronald L. Claveloux, Note, The
Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gor-
such Controversy, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1333.
136. Gorsuch married Robert Burford, then Director of the Interior De-
partment's Bureau of Land Management, in February 1982. EPA Head Be-
comes Anne McGill Burford, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1983, at A12. I will refer to
her as Ms. Burford.
137. The EPA Dispute in Brief, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1983, at B12.
138. Dale Russakoff, President Bends on EPA Data: Offers to Show Docu-
ments He Ordered Withheld, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1983, at Al (Mhe con-
troversy has grown from the initial concern of House Democrats that the
Reagan administration was trying to undo a decade of environmental pro-
tection policy .... ").
139. Cass Peterson, House Panel Votes to Cite Rita Lavelle, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 1983, at A3.
140. Mary Thornton, House Subcommittee Votes to Cite EPA Administrator
for Contempt, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1982, at A6.
141. Dale Russakoff & Mary Thornton, Burford Fights to Save Job at EPA:
Powerful Allies Abandon Her Cause, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1983, at Al.
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sure of "enforcement-sensitive" documents would compromise
the government's strategies and advantage defendants. 42
The House Public Works Investigating Subcommittee
voted to cite Ms. Burford for contempt and, on December 16,
Ms. Burford became the highest executive officer to be cited for
contempt by the full House."' The House certified the con-
tempt citation to the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia
for presentment to the grand jury; however, the Department of
Justice refused to act on the certification.1" Instead, the De-
partment of Justice filed a civil lawsuit in the district court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the assertion of executive
privilege trumped the congressional subpoena. In the action,
controversially styled United States v. House of Representa-
tives,'45 the district court dismissed the case as an improper ex-
ercise of judicial power, seeming to ignore the D.C. Circuit's
prior adjudication of a document dispute in Senate Select
Committee and technically distinguishing AT&T because the
subpoena there was directed at a private party.14 6 District
Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr. rejected the administration's use
of executive privilege as a sword rather than as a shield:
Judicial resolution... will never become necessary unless Admin-
istrator Gorsuch becomes a defendant in either a criminal contempt
proceeding or other legal action taken by Congress. The difficulties
apparent in prosecuting Administrator Gorsuch for contempt of Con-
gress should encourage the two branches to settle their differences
without further judicial involvement. Compromise and cooperation,
rather than confrontation, should be the aim of the parties.1 47
Judge Smith grounded his decision on prudential princi-
ples of judicial restraint to avoid deciding constitutional ques-
142. Leslie Maitland, House Unit to Get Subpoenaed Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1983, at Bll. See generally HOUsE REPORT ON THE BURFORD
CONTROVERSY, supra note 65, at 1-25 (outlining the factual and legal back-
ground leading to the House's citation of Burford for contempt).
143. Dale Russakoff, House Votes EPA Chief in Contempt, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 1982, at Al.
144. Leslie Maitland, Administration Battles Citation of EPA Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1982, at Al.
145. 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983); see Stanley M. Brand, Battle Among
the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C. L. REV. 901, 904 (1987)
("When the Department of Justice brought an unprecedented and ill-fated suit
against the House of Representatives to enjoin and declare illegal a House
contempt citation against the EPA administrator for refusal to produce docu-
ments, it presumptuously and with no statutory authority sued in the name of
the United States.").
146. 556 F. Supp. at 152.
147. Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
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tions and intervening in executive-congressional disputes
"until all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted. " 148
Judge Smith implied that the executive branch could not in-
voke the federal courts to resist a congressional subpoena on
the basis of executive privilege, unless the executive was to
first criminally prosecute one of its officers.1 49
Two weeks later, the Reagan administration relented and
allowed Subcommittee members to view the documents in pri-
vate sessions. 50 President Reagan confirmed that public per-
ception, not the underlying law enforcement interests, strongly
influenced his ability to maintain government secrets: "I can no
longer insist on executive privilege if there is a suspicion in the
minds of the American people that it is being used to cover up
wrongdoing."' Stanley Brand, counsel to the clerk of the
House, characterized President Reagan's decision as "total ca-
pitulation."' 52 On March 3, the Department of Justice, having
launched its own investigation into possible misconduct at the
EPA, told Ms. Burford that, in order to avoid "the appearance
of a conflict of interest," it could no longer represent her re-
garding her contempt of Congress citation. 53 On March 9,
1983, Ms. Burford resigned.154
The battle over the EPA documents spawned a subsequent
controversy. In 1983, at the urging of Democrats on the com-
mittees that investigated Superfund, the House Judiciary
148. Id. at 152.
149. Id. at 153.
150. Maitland, supra note 142, at Bil.
151. Daniel Benjamin, Mutually Assured Corruption, WASH. MONTHLY,
Jan. 1986, at 12. President Reagan also stated:
[I]t is now clear that prolonging this legal debate can only result in a
slowing down of the release of information to Congress, therefore fos-
tering suspicion in the public mind that, somehow, the important
doctrine of executive privilege is being used to shield possible wrong-
doing.
Philip Shabecoff, Mrs. Burford Quits at EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1983, at
Al.
152. Shabecoff, supra note 151, atAl.
153. Maureen Dowd, Lonely at the EPA Top, TIME, Mar. 14, 1983, at 28;
Reagan Expresses Faith in EPA Head, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1983, at A12; Rus-
sakoff & Thornton, supra note 141, at Al.
154. David Hoffman & Cass Peterson, Burford Quits as EPA Administra-
tor, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1983, at Al. In her resignation letter, Ms. Burford
stated that she hoped her departure would "terminate the controversy and
confusion that has crippled my agency" and "distracted [the President] from
pursuing the critical domestic and international goals" of his administration.
Id.
1997] 659
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Committee conducted a separate investigation into Depart-
ment of Justice activities in the EPA controversy, including the
Department's role in advising President Reagan to assert ex-
ecutive privilege. In December of 1985, the Judiciary Commit-
tee issued its report accusing Assistant Attorney General
Theodore B. Olson of giving false and misleading testimony in
his appearance before the Committee on March 10, 1983.155
The report led to the appointment of an Independent Counsel
to investigate Olson. After a three-year investigation, Inde-
pendent Counsel Alexia Morrison announced that she would
not seek an indictment against Olson. 156
In addition to validating the constitutionality of the In-
dependent Counsel statute,157 the investigation of Olson cost
taxpayers more than $1 million, did not involve any allegation
that Olson acted outside his duties or for personal gain, 5 ' and
promised to cause future executive branch attorneys to think
twice about recommending that a president assert executive
privilege. The Olson investigation suggests that a sufficiently
motivated faction in Congress can effectively punish executive
officers for an assertion of executive privilege by launching an
investigation into the propriety of the assertion of the privilege
itself.
The conventional view of this controversy is that the 1982-
83 congressional investigations of the EPA revealed that the
Agency improperly made enforcement decisions based upon
political considerations, instead of environmental concerns,159
and that Burford's aides were too closely allied with industry,
creating conflicts of interest. 6 ° The political fallout seemed to
confirm these suspicions. Ms. Burford and twenty of her aides
155. HOUSE JUDICIARY CoMM., INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE WITHHOLDING OF ENvIRONmENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY DOcuMENTS FROM CONGRESS IN 1982-83, H.R. REP. No. 99-
435, at 612-40 (1985) [hereinafter OLSON REPORT]. The report also alleged
that Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Carol Dinkins had wrongfully withheld certain documents from the
committee, thus obstructing its investigation. Id. at 640-68.
156. Philip Shenon, Special Prosecutor Drops EPA Case Without Indict-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1988, at Al.
157. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (holding that the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599, which imposed a "for cause"
limit on the President's ability to remove Independent Counsels, did not vio-
late the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, or, generally, the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duties).
158. Ronald J. Ostrow, Independent Counsel Explains Why She Didn't
Prosecute Figure in '83 EPA Probe, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1989, at A17.
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either resigned or were fired. 161 President Reagan fired Super-
fund chief Rita Lavelle, who was later convicted for lying to
Congress about an alleged conflict of interest and spent four
months in federal prison.' 62 Unlike the Watergate tapes, how-
ever, the EPA documents which were the subject of the execu-
tive privilege assertion apparently have revealed no smoking
gun. The Democratic majority of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee investigating Ted Olson alleged merely that the documents
contained "signposts" of EPA misconduct which should have
been investigated more carefully prior to urging President
Reagan to assert executive privilege.163 After its investigation
in August 1983, the Justice Department exonerated Ms. Bur-
ford and five of her former aides at the EPA of any criminal
wrongdoing.'6
An editorial which appeared in the Washington Post sug-
gests that what began as policy differences between the Bur-
ford team and the Democrats in the House regarding the rigors
of environmental enforcement turned into a major scandal be-
cause President Reagan did the unspeakable: he asserted ex-
ecutive privilege, a decision which guaranteed a congressional
attack, media frenzy, and political defeat.165 President Reagan
159. For example, Congress heard evidence that Ms. Burford had stalled a
$6.1 million federal grant to abate a toxic waste site in California so as to
avoid aiding Jerry Brown's (then Democratic Governor of California) 1982
Senate campaign. Stuart Taylor, U.S. Won't Charge Ex-EPA Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1983, at Al.
160. See generally Editorial, The Burford Saga Goes On, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 1986, at A10 (describing the EPA controversy and criticizing the actions of
the Justice Department).
161. Marianne Lavelle, Regulation: Fragile Change at Best, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 18, 1988, at 26.
162. Lavelle was convicted of lying to two congressional committees re-
garding when she learned of a potential conflict of interest with her former
employer, Aerojet-General, which had allegedly contributed wastes to the
Stringfellow Acid Pits in Riverside, California. Lavelle maintained that the
trial was about her memory of telephone calls, rather than any corruption at
the EPA. See, e.g., Ralph Frammolino, Lavelle Serving Sentence in San Diego,
LA. TIMES, May 11, 1986, at Bi.
163. OLSON REPORT, supra note 155, at 9.
164. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY PRESENT AND FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 51-53 (Aug. 11, 1983). In addition, the Jus-
tice Department presented the circumstances of the dispute to the grand jury
which declined unanimously to indict Ms. Burford. Peterson, supra note 13,
at 574 (citing a letter from Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Attorney, to Hon. Thomas
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 5, 1983)).
165. Robert G. Kaiser, EPA Fiasco, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1983, at Cl.
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suggested that the bitter executive privilege battle was, in real-
ity, opposition to his administration's business-friendly envi-
ronmental policies which escalated to partisan bloodsport.166
In the end, the executive officials who came closest to criminal
liability, Lavelle and Olson, were vulnerable not for their ac-
tions in the executive branch, but for the way they responded
to questions posed by the congressional investigating commit-
tees.
E. WILLIAM REHNQUIST AND OLC MEMOS (1986)
In 1986, President Reagan nominated then Associate Jus-
tice William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. During the course of the subsequent confirmation
hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee asked the Reagan
administration for legal and other memoranda written by
Rehnquist when he headed the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
during the Nixon administration from 1969 to 1971. Purport-
edly exercising its "advise and consent" fimction to evaluate
Rehnquist's character and legal philosophy, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee wanted to examine Rehnquist's role in advising
the Nixon administration on Watergate as well as military
surveillance of civilians, the shootings at Kent State Univer-
sity, and the wiretapping and arrests of anti-Vietnam war
demonstrators. 67 The Committee also was interested in alle-
gations that Rehnquist failed to recuse himself on matters be-
[T]he administration flouted one of this city's cardinal rules. Nothing
except-maybe--sexual misbehavior eggs on Washington's wolves
like the appearance of a cover-up. Last September, when the Justice
Department and the White House decided to claim "executive privi-
lege" to withhold from Congress some disputed EPA documents, the
administration made the uncomfortable bed in which it now tosses
and turns. The appearance of cover-up put EPA on the front page.
Id.
166. The President stated:
I don't think that the people who were attacking [Ms. Burford] were
concerned about the environment. I don't think they were concerned
about any possible wrongdoing .... I think this administration and
its policies were their target. And, frankly, I wonder how they man-
age to look at themselves in the mirror in the morning.
Interview with Forrest Sawyer of WAGA-TV in Atlanta, Ga., 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 390 (Mar. 11, 1983); see also Remarks and a Question-and-
Answer Session with Reporters, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1103 (July 27,
1984) (defending the actions of Burford).
167. Howard Kurtz & Ruth Marcus, Democrats Seek to Subpoena Papers,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1986, at Al.
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fore the Supreme Court that related to his work in the execu-
tive branch.16
President Reagan asserted executive privilege to preserve
the confidentiality of advice given to the President and the
OLC's ability to provide frank, legal advice to the executive
branch. 16 9 The assertion of executive privilege offended Demo-
crats on the Judiciary Committee and effectively halted
Rehnquist's confirmation. 7 This controversy was similar to
the Senate Judiciary Committee's refusal to act on President
Nixon's nomination of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney Gen-
eral in 1973 until Nixon allowed a White House aide to tes-tify.171
Senator Edward M. Kennedy equated the controversy to
Watergate, accusing the Reagan administration of engaging "in
yet another cover-up."172 Kennedy stated: "Ironically, as assis-
tant attorney general from 1969 to 1971, Rehnquist was advis-
ing President Nixon... at the very time the government was
engaging in the improprieties that spawned the Watergate
scandal and later drove Nixon from office." 173 Kennedy cited
the Kleindienst confirmation as precedent and urged his col-
leagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee to send a clear
message to President Reagan: "[N]o documents, no confirma-
tion."74 Realizing a Committee subpoena was inevitable and
wishing to avoid a confrontation, the administration relented
(just five days after President Reagan asserted executive
168. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53
BROOKLYN L. REV. 589 (1987) (criticizing Rehnquist's failure to recuse himself
in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)).
169. Stanley I. Kutler, Executive Privilege Redux, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Sept. 22, 1986, at 16.
170. Ronald J. Ostrow & David Savage, Senate Panel to Receive Rehnquist
Documents, L-. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1986, at Al.
171. President Nixon withdrew his claim of executive privilege and allowed
the aide to testify, saving Kleindiensgs confirmation. Later that year, the
Judiciary Committee used the same tactic to induce testimony regarding the
confirmation of L. Patrick Grey as FBI director. This time, President Nixon
refused to allow the testimony; consequently, Grey's nomination failed. Rob-
ert C. Randolph & Daniel C. Smith, Executive Privilege and the Congressional
Right of Inquiry, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 621, 649 (1973).
172. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Editorial, Rehnquist: No Documents, No
Senate Confirmation, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1986, at B5.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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privilege) and agreed to give the Judiciary Committee access to
all of the memoranda.
75
After the Rehnquist controversy, the President is on notice
that if he intends to appoint a former executive official to an
office requiring the Senate's advice and consent, the President
should be prepared to produce all documents the nominee pre-
pared while in office, regardless of the consequences to the in-
stitutional interests of the executive branch.
F. THE WHITE HOUSE TRAVEL OFFICE FIRINGS (1996)
On May 19, 1993, the Clinton administration dismissed
White House Travel Office l76 chief Billy Ray Dale and six other
Travel Office employees.77 The White House allegedly exag-
gerated reports of mismanagement in the Travel Office'78 and
allegedly inappropriately pressured the IRS and FBI to inves-
tigate the Travel Office employees to obscure the political de-
cision of replacing the staff with President and Mrs. Clinton's
political allies.179 A White House aide claimed that First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton instigated the firings.' Both she and
President Clinton have denied any substantive involvement in
the decision.' As a result of these allegations, the House Gov-
175. Ostrow & Savage, supra note 170, at Al.
176. The Travel Office coordinates travel for members of the media who
cover the President. John M. Broder, Panel Votes to Cite 3 For Contempt In
Travel Office Case, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at 17.
177. Toni Locy, For White House Travel Office, a Two-Year Trip of Trouble,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1995, at A4.
178. David Johnson, Mrs. Clinton Responds to Travel Office Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at A23. Mr. Dale was tried and acquitted of embezzle-
ment charges in 1995. Id.
179. Pat Griffith, Travel Office Staff Testifies; GOP Asking if IRS, FBI
were Misused to Bolster Firings, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 1996, at
A3. Travel office employees serve at the pleasure of the President.
180. David Johnson, Ex-Employees of Travel Office Say Rumors Led to
Their Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A15. David Watkins, a White
House Administrative Aide, dismissed the Travel Office employees and re-
placed them with a Little Rock, Arkansas travel agency which coordinated
charters for the Clintons during the 1992 presidential campaign. In an un-
dated draft memorandum produced to the investigating committee, Watkins
stated that the First Lady demanded the firings and exercised direct and indi-
rect influence to achieve that result. Mrs. Clinton has stated that she merely
expressed concern about rumors of financial mismanagement at the Travel
Office and played no role in the firing decision. David Johnson, Memo Places
Hillary Clinton at Core of Travel Office Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at Al.
181. Johnson, Ex-Employees of Travel Office Say Rumors Led to Their
Ouster, supra note 180, at A15. The President initially stated that the White
House fired the Travel Office employees to implement the President's tar-
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ernment Reform & Oversight Committee launched an investi-
gation into the circumstances surrounding the dismissals. The
Committee initially requested and then, on January 5 and
February 7, 1996, subpoenaed, all documents related to the
firings.182 In response, the White House produced over 40,000
pages of documents.'83 On May 9, 1996, White House Counsel
Jack Quinn asserted executive privilege on behalf of President
Clinton to withhold disclosure of approximately 3,000 pages of
documents. 184 The documents purportedly included confiden-
tial White House legal advice and deliberations in preparation
for the White House's response to the Committee's hearings
and the investigation of the firings by Independent Counsel
Kenneth Start.8  That day, the Committee voted to hold
Quinn and two former White House aides in contempt of Con-
gress. 18 6 Committee Chairman William F. Clinger, Jr. criti-
cized President Clinton's decision to assert executive privilege:
"Executive privilege has only been invoked once in this decade
and never by President Clinton who once claimed to [have] the
most open and cooperative administration in history but has
now turned to a Watergate legal loophole to prevent legitimate
oversight by Congress."187
Representative Clinger emphasized that the subject mat-
ter of the Travel Office firings was not sufficiently important
geted 25% reduction in White House staff and because of concerns of misman-
agement at the Travel Office. Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town
Meeting, 29 WEEKLY COmP. PRES. DOC. 957 (May 27, 1993). A report pre-
pared by the White House Chief of Staffs office details evidence of financial
mismanagement in the Travel Office, but admits that the firing decision was
arrived at hastily, employees were not treated with sufficient sensitivity, and
the White House failed to guard against the appearance of favoritism and in-
appropriate pressure on the FBI. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE,
TRAVEL OFFICE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (July 2, 1993) (on file with author).
The report denies that the White House had contacts with the IRS regarding
the Travel Office matter. Id.
182. David Johnson, Subpoena Issued in Travel Office Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1996, at A7; Charles Tiefer, Contempt of Congress: Turf Battle Ahead,
LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 1996, at 26.
183. Susan Baer, White House Travel Controversy: House Panel Recom-
mends Contempt Charges, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 10, 1996, at A14.
184. David Johnson, Panel Moves to Gain Travel Office Files, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 1996, at A26.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Committee to Vote on Contempt of Congress Resolution in Travel Of-
fice Matter, Government Press Releases, Federal Document Clearing House,
Inc., May 8, 1996, available in WESTLAW, GOVPR database, 1996 WL
8786618.
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(compared to, for example, national security matters) to war-
rant an assertion of executive privilege.'88 Representative
Clinger delayed a vote on the contempt resolution by the full
House "to provide the White House with a reasonable last op-
portunity to produce the records."189
To avert a full House vote on the contempt resolution
against Quinn, the White House produced approximately 1,000
pages of the previously withheld documents and a privilege log
which indexed the remaining withheld documents. 190 The pro-
duced documents revealed that the Clinton administration re-
quested a confidential FBI report' 9' on Mr. Dale seven months
after he had been fired. 192 The White House later admitted
that similar FBI reports were requested for over 400 former
Reagan and Bush White House employees. After investigating
these requests, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh stated that the
administration's requests for these records were unjustified
and constituted "egregious violations of privacy."'93 The White
188. Representative Clinger stated:
How in the world, I have to ask myself, could Travelgate documents
rise to the level of executive privilege. This is not a DEA... CIA, or
any other kind of national security matter that we're dealing with.
This has nothing to do with foreign relations. This is the Travel Of-
fice, for Heaven's sakes. In the past, executive privilege has been re-
served for only the most important and sensitive and critical admini-
stration activities. This may be sensitive, but it certainly is not
critical or important. While I believe in the doctrine of executive
privilege, I oppose its use when allegations of wrongdoing are at
hand, as they are in this case.
News Conference to Discuss the Investigation into the Firings at the White
House Travel Office, Political Transcripts, Federal Document Clearing House,
Inc., May 29, 1996, available in WESTLAW, USPOLTRANS database, 1996
WL 283709 (F.D.C.H.).
189. Al Kamen, White House Travel Probers Set to Vote on Contempt,
WASH. POST, May 9, 1996, at A10.
190. Eric Schmitt, White House Gives Committee More Papers in Dismissal
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A20.
191. These reports contain summaries of the FBI fitness investigations.
The summaries include statements from an applicant's neighbors, acquain-
tances, etc. Many of these reports contain derogatory statements about an
applicant's character which may be hearsay and are often unsubstantiated
and inaccurate. Mary Jacoby, House Panel Probes White House Handling of
FBI Files, CHIc. TRIB., June 20, 1996, at 10.
192. The request form contained the name (typed) of former White House
counsel Bernard Nussbaum. Mr. Nussbaum has denied sending the request
or knowing of its existence. Neil A. Lewis, Panel Chairman Demands White
House Security Records, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at A15.
193. George Lardner & John F. Harris, FBI Chief Says Request for Files
was Unjustified, WASH. POST, June 15, 1996, at Al.
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House explained that the files were requested by mistake by
aides processing security clearances for White House access.
President Clinton apologized for the FBI requests, describing
them as "an innocent bureaucratic snafu."194 The President
immediately ordered changes in White House procedures to as-
sure that similar acquisitions of FBI files would not occur
again.195
Nevertheless, this embarrassing revelation fueled con-
gressional pressure for the White House to abandon its claim of
privilege over the remaining documents. For example, House
Speaker Newt Gingrich stated: "[If the President has a shred
of sincerity and any sadness about this [he should] release the
other 2,000 pages."196 The rhetoric employed by both sides im-
mediately escalated to advocacy of polar positions at the consti-
tutional level. Representative Clinger asserted:
[W]e cannot allow the White House or the executive branch to dictate
to a committee of Congress what we can or cannot have to conduct
legitimate oversight of activities in the executive branch. We just
can't permit that. So I think I am holding up the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives in pursuing this. 97
White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said that the
House of Representatives "can avoid a constitutional confron-
tation by sitting down, being reasonable and recognizing that
the Constitution of the United States does grant the President
the right to formulate his policy and have a separate branch of
government."9 8 Vice President Al Gore portrayed the House
Republicans as "determined to provoke a confrontation by go-
ing for the kinds of memos directly to the President that no
president has or ever would say are legitimate for the Congress
to ask for."'99 Notwithstanding the imploring rhetoric, the
White House ultimately was forced to capitulate as to its re-
194. Brian McGrory, Clinton Apologizes for FBI Files Error, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 13, 1996, at A14; Paul Richter & Ronald J. Ostrow, Clinton
Apologizes for FBI Files on GOP, L.A. TIMEs, June 13, 1996, at A15.
195. McGrory, supra note 194, at A14.
196. Nancy E. Roman, Gingrich Slams Clinton's Ethics, WASH. TIMES,
June 14, 1996, at Al.
197. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 19, 1996), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Script File, Transcript #1778 (interview of Rep.
Clinger).
198. White House Scrambles to Provide Papers, UPI, June 24, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
199. The Late Edition (CNN television broadcast, June 23, 1996), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Script File, Transcript #141 (interview of Vice Presi-
dent Gore).
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maining claim of executive privilege. On June 25, 1996, the
White House agreed to provide Committee members and their
staff with security access to the remaining documents. The ac-
cess was limited to note taking during the review process, al-
though documents could be copied if they related to the FBI
files. 20
The Travel Office dispute parallels previous conflicts. A
president's assertion of executive privilege was met with swift
condemnation by the requesting committee, which held the as-
serting executive officer in contempt of Congress. Conse-
quently, the President curtailed his claim of privilege only a
short time after the initial claim. In this case, the Clinton
administration was forced to partially relent in its claim of ex-
ecutive privilege only twenty-one days after Counsel Quinn
made the assertion and the Government Reform Committee in-
stantly found him to be in contempt of Congress. The admini-
stration agreed to provide access to the remaining documents
after an additional twenty-five days of congressional and media
pressure. The participants' rhetoric suggested that they
viewed the document dispute as a zero-sum adversarial con-
test.20 1 Members of Congress employed analogies to Water-
gate.20 2 Once the White House admitted that the documents
200. Jessica Lee, White House to Let Panel See Documents, USA TODAY,
June 26, 1996, at 8A; see Associated Press, Travelgate Documents Released,
NEwsDAY, June 26, 1996, at A47.
201. See supra notes 196-199 and accompanying text (citing examples of
the verbal sparring in this dispute). Representative Clinger characterized the
White House May 30, 1996 decision to produce 1,000 of the 3,000 documents
as the "beginning of a victory for the House." 142 CONG. REC. H5655 (daily
ed. May 30, 1996) (statement of Rep. Clinger). After the FBI files revelation,
Senator Charles Grassley congratulated Clinger on his "dogged pursuit" of
documents notwithstanding the assertion of executive privilege. Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding the FBI Files Controversy (C-
Span television broadcast, June 20, 1996).
From a purely political perspective, Representative Clinger's "dogged
pursuit" scored political points by embarrassing the White House. It was a
"win" for Republicans in Congress and a "loss" for the Democrats in the White
House, an example sure to be noted by members of future Congresses who
have little incentive to negotiate with or to defer to the next president assert-
ing executive privilege. To the contrary, the President's political opponents in
Congress potentially may achieve a political victory by pursuit of an uncom-
promising demand for full disclosure, either by uncovering embarrassing
documents or by portraying the President as a philosopher-king unwilling to
share his secrets with the electorate.
202. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (statement of Rep. Clinger
analogizing the executive withholding of documents to Watergate). The in-
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originally withheld under a claim of executive privilege evi-
denced at least an "administrative snafu," it was impossible to
maintain its claim of privilege. Rightly or wrongly, the revela-
tion confirmed the popular perception that presidents use ex-
ecutive privilege to cloak embarrassing information, or possi-
bly, evidence of corruption. Because documents, initially
withheld, suggested evidence of incompetence or wrongdoing,
and because 1996 was an election year in which the opposition
had seized upon the document conflict as reflecting negatively
on the integrity of the White House,2 °3 the typical suspicion re-
garding executive privilege was exacerbated. President Clin-
ton simply lacked the practical ability to protect, by executive
privilege, plausible executive branch interests in confidential-
ity of legal advice and strategic deliberations."
IV. EVALUATION OF THE BATTLE
While commentators have hailed "functional accommoda-
tion" as a panacea and preferable to litigation and federal
courts meddling in the working negotiation process between
the political branches,2 °5 this presupposes that the accommo-
vestigation was dubbed "Travelgate" by conservative media and Republican
members of Congress.
203. In a June 22, 1996 radio broadcast, Republican presidential candidate
Bob Dole urged the White House to abandon its claim of executive privilege
and fully cooperate with the House committee. Melissa Healy, Dole Assails
White House over FBI Files: The GOP Candidate Questions the Administra-
tion's Ethics, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1996, at A21.
204. Prior to this Article's publication, and in the waning days of the 104th
Congress, President Clinton invoked executive privilege twice to prevent dis-
closure of subpoenaed executive branch documents to congressional investi-
gating committees: (1) An April 1995 memorandum written by FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh and DEA Chief Thomas A. Constantine, which criticized the
fragmentation of drug enforcement efforts among various executive branch
entities, and (2) documents potentially probative of whether the administra-
tion knew that members of a U.S.-trained Haitian security force were involved
in political assassinations in Haiti. President Clinton withheld the drug pol-
icy memo on October 1, 1996 to protect the deliberative process and withheld
the Haiti documents on September 23, 1996 to protect diplomatic/national se-
curity secrets. Adjournment of Congress averted an election year constitu-
tional battle. Charles Tiefer argues that these disputes demonstrate that "the
two political branches of government no longer fear the stigma once associ-
ated with escalation to a subpoena/presidential privilege dispute," preferring
"a dramatic subpoena/privilege fight" to compromise. Charles Tiefer, The
Fight's the Thing; Why Congress and Clinton Rush to Battles With Subpoena
and Executive Privilege, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at 25.
205. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing commentators who
view political accommodation as effective and who doubt the effectiveness of
federal court intervention in these disputes).
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dation process is working. A fair assessment of the battles be-
tween Congress and the executive branch over access to docu-
ments, however, reveals that, without access to a civil proceed-
ing, the President cannot effectively assert executive privilege
to resist disclosure once a dispute with Congress escalates be-
yond the subpoena stage. This section (a) summarizes the ob-
stacles facing presidents (including political coercion by Con-
gress and the media and an ill-suited criminal contempt
process); (b) advocates the availability of federal court review
in a civil proceeding to resolve escalated disputes; and (c) ex-
amines the impact of an Independent Counsel investigation
which overlaps a congressional investigation.
A. A PRIVILEGE PRESUMED ILLICIT
The case studies suggest that, in escalated information
battles, a claim of executive privilege is insufficient to resist
disclosure, regardless of legitimate executive interests. A
president who asserts the privilege will suffer political damage
by relying on a tool which the American political culture pre-
sumes is intended to cloak corruption. The consequence is that
modern presidents, seeking to avoid the perception of stone-
walling and believing that they will have to produce the docu-
ments in the long run, may become too cooperative with Con-
gress, releasing documents and information in a way that will
damage the personal, institutional, and national interests
identified in Part II of this Article.
The arsenal of weapons Congress can use to win these es-
calated battles (and induce over-cooperation by administra-
tions) is overwhelming. The process allows several opportuni-
ties for votes on whether to subpoena documents and testimony
and, later, whether to hold executive officers in contempt.
Congress can purportedly insist that a U.S. attorney seek a
criminal indictment against executive officials found in con-
tempt of Congress.206 Congress may also threaten to withhold
appropriations for executive programs, fail to act on the Presi-
dent's initiatives and nominees, and call for an Independent
Counsel (implying that executive privilege is being used to con-
ceal unlawful activities and that the assertion of the privilege
is, itself, unlawful). Ultimately, members of Congress can
206. See infra notes 220-234 and accompanying text (discussing the statu-
tory process, and constitutional questions raised by, the Contempt of Congress
statute, 2 U.S.C. §§ 192-194).
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threaten impeachment of executive officers, including the
President, who seek to resist a congressional subpoena on the
grounds of executive privilege.0 7 Congressional action at each
stage of the battle guarantees front page stories in the national
press, with headlines suggesting executive branch wrongdo-
ing.20 1 Moreover, any attempt by the executive branch to com-
promise or accommodate the congressional investigation is
conventionally interpreted as a capitulation and concession by
the executive that its assertion of executive privilege was
baseless from the start. For example, Brand and Connelly ar-
gue that "[t]he illegitimacy of the underlying privilege claim in
the [Burford] case is perhaps best illustrated by the executive's
eventual capitulation to the legislative demands."20 9
Editorials about recent assertions of executive privilege
reveal that many in the media perceive all claims of executive
privilege as spurious." ' Many editorials regarding the White-
207. Congress has plenary authority to impeach executive and judicial offi-
cers for "political" (i.e., not necessarily criminal) offenses. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (giving the House of Representatives the "sole power" to im-
peach); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (giving the Senate the "sole power" to con-
duct impeachment trials); THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 439 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961 (describing impeachable offenses as "political").
The Constitution does not precisely define impeachable offenses; they may be
whatever Congress "considers [them] to be at a given moment of history." 116
CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970) (statement of then Congressman Gerald Ford).
One of the House Judiciary Committee's Articles of Impeachment against
President Nixon was directed toward his failure to comply with the Commit-
tee's subpoena. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M.
NIxON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 192-96
(1974). Some members of the Committee believed that it was more appropri-
ate for federal courts to adjudge the sufficiency of President Nixon's assertion
of executive privilege than to express congressional disagreement by im-
peachment. See Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Auton-
omy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30, 36-
38 (1974).
Congress's definition of impeachable offenses is probably unreviewable.
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233-34 (1993) ("[T]he Judiciary, and
the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen [by the Framers] to have
any role in impeachments."). For an overview of the process, see Randall K
Miller, The Collateral Matter Doctrine: The Justiciability of Cases Regarding
the Impeachment Process, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 777 (1996).
208. For examples of such headlines, see Chapman, Hill Panel Votes to
Cite Watt for Contempt, supra note 118, at Al; Editorial, A Whiff of Water-
gate?, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1986, at A19; Mrs. Gorsuch to Jail?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1982, at A18; Susan Schmidt, White House Eases Stance on Notes:
Whitewater Panel Acts to Enforce Subpoena, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1995, at
Al.
209. Brand & Connelly, supra note 27, at 82 n.85.
210. See Peterson, supra note 13, at 628-29. Peterson states:
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water notes controversy reiterate the presumption that execu-
tive privilege is an illicit tool to conceal wrongdoing.21" ' An edi-
torial appearing in the San Francisco Examiner underscores
the political consequences to presidents presumptuous enough
to consider a claim of executive privilege. The editorial stated
that the Clinton administration's "Nixonian" suggestion that it
may assert executive privilege ensures "a series of unflattering
news stories focusing on his claim of executive privilege during
the 1996 presidential election year, and nightmares for his
campaign handlers."212 In the post-Watergate era where the
mere allegation of official wrongdoing is equivalent to guilt,
and where resistance to disclosure is tantamount to a cover-up
Once a dispute reaches the subpoena level, the press becomes a major
factor in the political conflict. Past experience suggests that Con-
gress can use the press as a substantial weapon to obtain requested
documents. As long as the need to uncover information within the
executive branch has appeared legitimate, the press has been sympa-
thetic to Congress's interests and quite skeptical of claims of execu-
tive privilege.
211. The following are examples of such editorials.
While I will admit the term "executive privilege" sounds authentic, I
remember President Nixon's attempt to invoke it in his attempt to
cover up the Watergate burglary proved it to be bogus .... [Tihe only
types of information I could envision that would impair the Presi-
dent's ability to do his job would be evidence of wrongdoing. That
would require the House to draw up and pass articles of impeach-
ment requiring the President to defend himself before the Senate.
Harry F. Armstrong III, Executive Privilege Is Not a Constitutional Right,
TIMES UNION, Dec. 26, 1995, at A8.
Whether the Clinton administration did anything improper after ob-
taining confidential information about the Whitewater investigations
remains to be seen, but the presidenfs foot-dragging on Senate
committee requests for documents certainly magnifies suspicions.
Attorney-client privilege? Executive privilege? Hogwash .... The
longer this administration stalls, the more people will conclude that
Whitewater is sending up some of the same disgusting odors as Wa-
tergate did a couple of decades ago. What is it about Washington
that clouds the minds of politicians? Ultimately, the decline and fall
of the Nixon presidency had little to do with the initial wrongdoing-
the underlings' burglary of the Democratic Party's national head-
quarters-and a lot to do with the president's personal role in the idi-
otic cover-up.
Whitewatergate?; "Executive Privilege" Rears its Ugly Head, COLUMBUS DIS-
PATCH, Dec. 17, 1995, at 2B; see also Whitewater; Senate Should Ratify Panel's
Subpoena Vote, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Dec. 16, 1995, at 34A ("Mr. Clinton
harms himself by refusing to surrender the notes. Increasingly people wonder
what he's hiding.").
212. Editorial, Building A Stonewall; The Clinton Administration's Claim
of "Executive Privilege" Only Creates Suspicion of a Watergate-Style Coverup,
S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 17, 1995, at C22.
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regardless of legitimate motives, functional accommodation has
vitiated the President's prerogative of executive privilege.
The reaction of the media mirrors the response of Capitol
Hill to assertions of executive privilege. Members of Congress
presume that the privilege is not justified. The more civil
members of Congress assert merely that congressional entitle-
ment to the sought-after information outweighs any interest
protected by privilege. A more common congressional observa-
tion is to deny any legitimate executive interest in nondisclo-
sure. Partisans allege that the assertion of privilege is tanta-
mount to a cover-up of unethical, wasteful, or illegal conduct in
the executive branch. Rather than protecting the President's
deliberative process or shielding state, military, or law en-
forcement secrets from improvident disclosure, members of
Congress allege that the President must be hiding something.
Ultimately, many members of Congress are offended when the
privilege is asserted.213 Every assertion of executive privilege
since the Nixon administration has been widely perceived on
Capitol Hill as the opening shot of an institutional battle.
Members of Congress will frequently allude to Watergate, as
they did in response to the Whitewater Notes controversy.
Senator Richard Shelby stated: "Wholesale memory loss, eva-
sive answers and claims of privilege against document produc-
tion. Sounds strangely familiar, doesn't it?"214 Senator Alfonse
D'Amato was less obtuse in his Watergate analogy. "We don't
know what they are hiding. But the American people are enti-
tled to know what it is.... It didn't work in Watergate, it is not
213. See Statement of Representative Stephen Horn, May 9, 1996, House
Government Reform & Oversight Committee, Transcript of Congressional
Testimony, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., May 9, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 1016325 (voting to hold in con-
tempt executive officers for failure to comply with the Committee's subpoena
for documents related to the Travel Office firings on the basis of executive
privilege).
When the White House ignores that subpoena, as it has done for the
last three months, the White House insults not just the Republicans
on this panel, but rather it insults the Republicans and the Demo-
crats who supported that subpoena. In fact, the White House's action
insults the entire House of Representatives and our rights under Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution. As a student and scholar of this institu-
tion, I am outraged at the culture of secrecy which exists in this
White House.
Id.
214. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Senate Aims at Clinton on Whitewater;
Amid Echoes of Watergate, Vote Sets Up a Court Battle, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 21,
1995, at 1.
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going to work now."215 An officer who asserts executive privi-
lege is "contumacious,"21 6 a term which conjures a recreant who
wantonly disregards authority, not a public servant who im-
plements the President's constitutional prerogative.
Some commentators have suggested that Congress is insti-
tutionally capable of deferring to legitimate assertions of ex-
ecutive privilege. Brand and Connelly argue that "[any as-
sumption that Congress will not take seriously a bona fide
assertion of executive privilege is simply unwarranted."217 The
partisan clashing and polar arguments revealed in the case
studies suggest this theory is implausible. Because Congress's
interests are adverse to those of the executive when a commit-
tee request is met with an assertion of executive privilege,
Congress's institutional objectives and ego extinguish objectiv-
ity vis-A-vis executive interests. Even if particular members of
Congress could be objective, the members do not have access to
the disputed documents and therefore would possess only the
most generalized basis upon which to defer to the President.
With the prevalence of divided government and the ten-
dency of officeholders to devote substantial time and effort to
inflict or defend against political injury, strategies of good faith
negotiation are unlikely to be pursued genuinely once battle
lines have been drawn by a formal assertion of executive
privilege coupled with a committee's vote to subpoena execu-
tive branch documents.218 In fact, information battles are a
215. Gretchen Cook, Clinton, Republicans Headed for Courtroom Show-
down Over Whitewater, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 15, 1995. Strident con-
gressional challenge to executive privilege is only one manifestation of
"Watergate backlash," i.e., congressional attempts to arrest claims of expan-
sive presidential power claimed by President Nixon. Statutory manifestations
include the War Powers Resolution (1973), Impoundment Control Act (1974),
the Foreign Assistance Act (1974), and the Ethics in Government Act (1978).
Since Watergate, Congress has generally increased the scope and aggressive-
ness of its executive branch oversight. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, From
Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401,409-10 (1989) (describing acts of Congress increasing
its oversight of the executive branch).
216. Congressional contempt resolutions cite the offending individual's
"contumacious conduct." See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 10,040 (reporting Ms. Bur-
ford's citation).
217. Brand & Connelly, supra note 27, at 85. As noted earlier, one of the
authors of this article, Stanley M. Brand, is former General Counsel to the
Clerk of the House of Representatives and participated in a lead counsel role
during the Watt and Burford controversies.
218. For example, in suggesting strategies to enable the branches to
achieve a win-win negotiation in these disputes, Dean Shane concedes that if
[Vol. 81:631674
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
useful political weapon for opponents of the President in Con-
gress. If issues of character and credibility dominate national
politics (and policy differences among political leaders are too
subtle to command popular interest) it becomes convenient for
investigating committees in Congress to make unreasonable
information demands on administrations and, after resistance
is encountered, accuse the administration of "stonewalling" or
"hiding something." Negotiation is also unavailable because of
the need to avoid institutional concessions. Attorneys for both
Congress and the White House prefer to argue that a proposed
course of action has been consistently followed by all control-
ling political parties in their institutions. An adverse prece-
dent undermines the ability to so argue and provides ammuni-
tion for the other side.219
The statute that criminalizes contempt of Congress itself
presumes that an assertion of executive privilege in response
to a congressional request for documents is illegitimate. The
statute makes it unlawful for any person to willfully refuse to
produce documents subpoenaed by a congressional commit-
tee."2 Section 194 of the statute further provides that the
Speaker of the House or President of the Senate shall certify a
contempt of Congress "to the appropriate U.S. attorney, whose
duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its
"congressional antagonists think it in their interest to harass or discredit a
cabinet member on partisan grounds, amicable negotiations may be impossi-
ble." Shane, Legal Disagreement, supra note 13, at 521. Similarly, Shane ac-
knowledges that if "the executive branch wants chiefly to discredit a particu-
lar legislator with that member's constituents, good faith negotiations will
obviously be more difficult." Id. at 522. Shane's comments imply that parti-
san bloodsport is the rare case. Given the current realities of national poli-
tics, these exceptions seem to swallow the rule.
219. Dean Shane's thoughtful and eloquent advocacy of negotiation and
formal agreements between the political branches "aimed at steering negotia-
tions away from categorical questions of prerogative-who is entitled to
what?-and toward the pragmatic resolution of immediate disputes," Shane,
Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 12, at 231, presumes a level of civility
and an ethic of cooperation not present in national politics today.
220. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1995). The statute provides in ful:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce
papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any
joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the
two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Con-
gress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to
answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more
than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail
for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
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action."22' Members of Congress have interpreted this statute
as imposing a ministerial obligation upon the U.S. attorney to
seek a grand jury indictment.222 As such, the statute arguably
constitutes an unconstitutional abrogation of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.223 Congress may not direct a U.S. attorney to seek a
criminal indictment-a U.S. attorney, a purely executive offi-
cer, may not be converted into a congressional agent by stat-
ute.224  Moreover, the Act arguably "contravenes the constitu-
221. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1995). The statute provides in full:
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 fails to
appear to testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or
documents, as required, or whenever any witness so summoned re-
fuses to answer any question pertinent to the subject under inquiry
before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or
concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any commit-
tee or subcommittee of either House of Congress, and the fact of such
failure or failures is reported to either House while Congress is in
session, or when Congress is not in session, a statement of fact con-
stituting such failure is reported to and filed with the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty of the
said President of the Senate or Speaker of the House, as the case may
be, to certify, and he shall so certify, the statement of facts aforesaid
under the seal of the Senate or House, as the case may be, to the ap-
propriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the
matter before the grand jury for its action.
222. See Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Offi-
cial Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Coun-
sel 129, 139 (1984) [hereinafter Olson Opinion] (stating the opinion of the
Speaker of the House that the U. S. Attorney must refer the matter to a grand
jury).
223. Cf. id. at 149-64 (finding that if the statute was interpreted to divest
the U. S. Attorney of discretion, the statute would create unconstitutional
separation of powers problems).
224. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (invalidating portions
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act which invested execu-
tive authority in the Comptroller, who was deemed a congressional agent be-
cause he or she was removable by Congress). The Court stated: "The Consti-
tution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of
officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts." Id. at 722.
Moreover, none of the historic cases involving Congress's inherent con-
tempt power bolsters the constitutionality of the statute as applied to an offi-
cer asserting executive privilege. Aside from the fact that Congress has
"practically abandoned" its inherent power (last using it in 1934), see Shane,
Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 12, at 228, the power is directed at co-
ercion, not punishment (i.e., it is not a power to impose criminal sanction).
More importantly, Congress has never attempted to invoke this procedure in
a case involving executive privilege. In addition to the political hazards of at-
tempting to incarcerate an executive branch official within the bowels of the
Capitol, the separation of powers may substantially restrict, if not extinguish,
the ability of Congress to use its inherent powers to try a cabinet officer or
U.S. President at the bar of the House or Senate, especially if the power is ex-
ercised in response to the officer asserting a presumptively valid privilege.
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tional requirement that all three branches must participate be-
fore a person is incarcerated for a federal crime."2 5 The con-
centration of lawmaking and prosecutorial discretion in one
branch is inconsistent with the constitutional scheme of dis-
persed powers.2
6
This separation of powers concern is exacerbated when the
individual held in contempt of Congress is an executive officer
who is asserting executive privilege. As in the Burford contro-
versy, a literal application of the contempt statute to executive
officers asserting privilege would place the Department of Jus-
tice in an awkward position: While championing the Presi-
dent's assertion of executive privilege, the Department would
simultaneously prosecute, or at least seek an indictment
against,n 7 the executive officer who is asserting the privilege
on the President's behalf. This officer is, in fact, a "pawn" who
would be prosecuted only to obtain judicial resolution of an in-
terbranch stalemate. 22 A criminal prosecution for contempt of
Congress punishes the executive officer and cannot lead to an
order requiring the executive to produce the subpoenaed docu-
ments. The proceeding would castigate individuals whose only
crimes were to obey their President's order to assert a consti-
tutional prerogative; it does nothing (directly) to advance Con-
gress's interest in access to the files.22 9 In his extensive analy-
sis of this issue, then-Assistant Attorney General Ted Olson
concluded that insofar as section 194 mandates prosecution in
these cases, the statute would unconstitutionally vitiate prose-
225. Peterson, supra note 13, at 593 (suggesting that, although prosecuto-
rial discretion is not unlimited, neither Congress nor the judiciary may compel
the prosecution of a particular individual or class of individuals).
226. The notion that Congress may unilaterally adjudge contempt of Con-
gress violations raises Bill of Attainder concerns. Id. at 607-08. The United
States Constitution prohibits Congress from passing Bills of Attainder. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
227. Even if a U.S. attorney was required to make the grand jury presen-
tation, a further issue is whether the attorney would be required to then pur-
sue the prosecution if an indictment were returned. The statute mentions
only the former. Either requirement impairs prosecutorial discretion and
probably breaches the separation of powers. If the attorney was required to
seek the indictment but was free to refuse to prosecute in these cases, the
statute would compel the attorney to perform a "useless act," a requirement
which the law abhors.
228. Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and
Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships,
1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231,259.
229. Olson Opinion, supra note 222, at 173-74.
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cutorial discretion and chill the President's ability to assert ex-
ecutive privilege.2
30
The statute is controversial and elicits sharp views from
members of the executive and Congress. For example, during
the Burford controversy, Representative Elliott H. Levitas,
chairman of one of the House committees seeking EPA docu-
ments, argued that by refusing to seek a criminal indictment
against Burford, officials in the Justice Department were
coming "perilously close to committing impeachable of-
fenses. '231 Testifying to a House committee during the Burford
controversy, U.S. Attorney Stanley S. Harris suggested that if
he was required to seek an indictment against Burford, his
presentment to the grand jury would be a "charade" in which
he would withhold key information and take other actions to
assure the indictment would not be returned.3 Executive
branch policy provides that a U.S. attorney should not prose-
cute an officer for contempt of Congress if the citation is based
upon a valid assertion of executive privilege. 3  Notwithstand-
ing this policy and the fact that Congress has no prosecutorial
authority, many journalists and commentators who discuss
contempt of Congress omit from their discussion the prosecu-
tion and adjudication stages which are prerequisites to crimi-
nal sanction. The lumping together of the congressional sub-
poena and criminal punishment gives the absolutely false
impression that a vote to approve a contempt resolution in
Congress is sufficient to adjudge an individual guilty of a
230. Id. at 180-81. Olson argued that congressional interests could be pro-
tected via a civil proceeding of the type rejected in United States v. House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). See supra notes 135-154 and
accompanying text (summarizing the District of Columbia court's finding that
the executive branch could not use the judiciary through a civil suit to resist a
congressional subpoena).
231. Maitland, supra note 144, at A14.
232. Examining and Reviewing the Procedures That Were Taken by the Of-
fice of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia in Their Implementation
of a Contempt Citation that was Voted by the Full House of Representatives
Against the Then Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Anne
Gorsuch Burford: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transp., 98th Cong. 50, at 36 (1984) (testimony of Stanley S. Harris, United
States Attorney).
233. See Department of Justice Memorandum, May 30, 1984, reprinted in
OLSON REPORT, supra note 155, at 2,584 (stating the testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Rex Lee that the Department of Justice would not present
the matter to a grand jury if it found the claim of executive privilege was
rightfully made).
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crime.234 This common tendency reinforces popular skepticism
regarding executive privilege. Whatever the requirements or
constitutionality of section 194, the existing process is unlikely
to result in vigorous assertions of executive privilege. If ex-
ecutive privilege is a constitutional prerogative that is pre-
sumptively valid, as the Court ruled in Nixon, then an execu-
tive officer should not have to become a criminal defendant,
being prosecuted by fellow executive officers, in order to suc-
cessfully assert the privilege against Congress.
B. A JUDICIAL ROLE IN POST-SUBPOENA DISPUTES
Prompt judicial resolution of an escalated document
stalemate in a civil proceeding could clarify and safeguard the
constitutional status of executive privilege. The case studies
reveal that the executive is in a weaker bargaining position
than is Congress in these escalated document battles. Because
federal courts have avoided the issue, the executive has been
forced to surrender a legitimate constitutional prerogative in
order to avoid the crippling effects of a perceived cover-up.
Federal courts should be available to remedy the failure of the
political negotiation process to adequately safeguard the sepa-
ration of national powers and national interests protected by
executive secrecy.235 The federal judiciary, unlike Congress,
234. See Paul Bedard, Executive Privilege Cited to Guard "Travelgate" Pa-
pers, WASH. TIMES, May 9, 1996, at A3 (commenting on a threatened House
committee contempt vote): "[It would be the first contempt charge filed by
Congress against the White House since 1982 and would be punishable by a$1,000 fine and up to a year in jail." Id.; see also William Safire, Editorial,
Shame on the FBI, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A17 (commenting on the
Travel Office investigation: "Congress threatened White House Counsel JackQuinn with criminal contempt. To avoid jail, he forked over a thousand of the
least damning documents"); The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television
broadcast, June 6, 1996), available in LEXIS, News library, Script file, Tran-
script #5544 (reporting on the Travel Office inquiry: "Clinger's committee then
voted to push for contempt of Congress charges against White House Counsel
Jack Quinn and two former White House aides. That citation carries a $1,000
fine and up to a year in prison").
235. This process failure is analogous to a "market failure" in economic
settings which justifies the imposition of corrective legal structure, judicial or
legislative, to safeguard values otherwise vulnerable in an uninhibited mar-
ket. Cf. Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An
Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1988) (describing the ra-
tionales for legal intervention in labor as "guaranteeing such minimal protec-
tions and entitlements as are necessary to assure the basic dignity, well-
being, and associational liberties of employees" which the bargaining process,
among participants of unequal power, fails to provide).
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has no stake in the document dispute. A federal court is a neu-
tral forum in which these separation of powers battles may be
resolved fairly.
While a federal court could likely assert subject matter ju-
risdiction over an escalated document dispute without much
difficulty,236 a court considering such a dispute would face sub-
stantial threshold issues related to ripeness and justiciability.
Pursuant to the "case or controversy" requirement of Article
111237 and prudential principles of judicial self-restraint, a fed-
eral court must not intervene in a congressional-executive
document dispute until the controversy is ripe. In Goldwater v.
Carter, Justice Powell articulated a standard by which to ad-
judge ripeness that applies sensibly to document disputes:238
Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Con-
gress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and
236. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over escalated infor-
mation disputes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers federal question
jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & TeL, 551 F.2d 384,
389 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In AT&T, the court found that the action arose under
the Constitution and the jurisdictional amount ($10,000) was inferred from
the potential damage to U.S. intelligence operations which the executive
claimed would ensue if AT&T complied with the House subpoena. Id.
A corollary issue not explored here is whether Congress would have
authority pursuant to its Article III powers over federal jurisdiction to extin-
guish all federal court review of congressional-executive information disputes
prior to the criminal contempt proceeding. Theoretically, a court could invali-
date such a statute on the premise that earlier Article III review of these dis-
putes is indispensable to the executive branch's ability to exercise its consti-
tutional duties. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the premises advanced in this
Article, it is highly unlikely that a court would challenge Congress in the face
of a jurisdiction-stripping statute. Considering that the Supreme Court has
never considered a congressional-executive information dispute and only a few
lower court decisions have addressed the issue, it would be difficult to argue
that, for example, adjudicating such disputes is a core fimction of the federal
courts or is so necessary to preserve the structure of government that invali-
dating a jurisdiction-stripping statute is required.
The Senate's civil contempt power under the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1365, which gives the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia jurisdiction "over any civil action brought by the Senate, or any
authorized committee or subcommittee," to enforce Senate subpoenas, ex-
empts disputes involving executive officers. Thus, while this statute cannot
establish district court jurisdiction over an escalated dispute, neither does it
remove these controversies from federal courts' jurisdiction. This Article ar-
gues that the federal courts can simply assert jurisdiction pursuant to the
federal question jurisdiction statute. Alternatively, Congress could expressly
confer jurisdiction in a new statute or through broader application of the
Ethics in Government Act.
237. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
238. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
[Vol. 81:631
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal considerations. The
Judicial branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of
power between the President and Congress until the political
branches reach a constitutional impasse.2u9
In these cases, a federal court must wait until each branch
has officially asserted conflicting constitutional claims, that is,
when the President has asserted executive privilege and a con-
gressional committee has voted to subpoena the disputed ma-
terials. As a practical matter, the political branches will con-
tinue to engage in a process of negotiation and accommodation
in the vast majority of cases in which neither of these events
occur. Once the controversy is ripe, however, either branch240
could seek judicial resolution of the competing constitutional
claims in a civil proceeding. This would allow federal court
adjudication of the dispute prior to a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding which, in the case of executive privilege, creates con-
flicts of interest in the Justice Department and requires an ex-
ecutive officer to endure exposure to criminal liability in order
to test an assertion of executive privilege.24'
A plausible argument could be made that federal court in-
tervention should await completion of all stages of the statu-
torily prescribed political process, that is, after a contempt vote
by a full house of Congress. This argument is based upon
principles of comity and the desire to avoid judicial review of
"moving targets" or disputes which could be mooted by a ca-
pitulation by either branch.242 For example, in dismissing suits
239. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that a chal-
lenge by a few members of Congress to President Carter's unilateral termina-
tion of a treaty with Taiwan was not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 997-98.
240. In Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1974), it was the congressional committee, not the
executive branch, which petitioned the district court to adjudge the sufficiency
of its subpoena duces tecum as against President Nixon's assertion of execu-
tive privilege.
241. As suggested previously, a criminal contempt proceeding is inconsis-
tent with the Court's constitutional ruling in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 713 (1973), that executive privilege is a constitutional prerogative which
is presumptively valid. 'Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief
Executive, it became the further duty of the District Court to treat the sub-
poenaed material as presumptively privileged ... " Id.
242. See Legal Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler of Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering to Asst. Attorney General Antonin Scalia, Dec. 12, 1975, reprinted
in OLSON REPORT, supra note 155, at 816.
1997] 681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
brought by private citizens to enjoin congressional investiga-
tions based upon First Amendment concerns, the D.C. Circuit
was persuaded that petitioners would have sufficient opportu-
nity to present their constitutional objections, if any, to the
subcommittee, full committee, full House, and, ultimately, as a
defense in the criminal contempt process.243 In these cases, the
petitioners could not demonstrate to the court facts "sufficiently
concrete and compelling to warrant judicial interruption" of the
244legislative process.
In escalated information disputes between Congress and
the President, by contrast, earlier judicial intervention is war-
ranted. The Court in Nixon held that ordinary mechanisms
delaying judicial review should not be followed where the
mechanisms "present an unnecessary occasion for constitu-
tional confrontation between two branches of the Govern-
ment."245 Moreover, a committee subpoena is a sufficiently in-
stitutional assertion of constitutional authority under Justice
Powell's formulation in Goldwater.246 Congress delegates to its
committees legal authority to act. A committee subpoena has a
legal and binding effect on recipients. The subpoena is in every
sense a legislative act which can be distinguished from a mere
expression of opinion by some members of Congress, as was the
case in Goldwater. If a committee subpoena was some informal
or preliminary action, then the executive branch would be free
to ignore it. Of course, the opposite is intended. Congress can-
not have it both ways: the ability to escalate an information
243. Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding
that a publisher's claim of First Amendment protection [to resist disclosing to
Congress the identity of anonymous authors] was insufficiently "concrete and
compelling" to allow the publisher to invoke equity jurisdiction and, thereby,
circumvent the "regular procedure for testing witness's claims"); Ansara v.
Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (declining to invali-
date the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security's subpoena duces tecum
directed to opponents of the Vietnam War, noting plaintiffs' potential to vindi-
cate their claims without resort to the courts). In Ansara, the court based its
refusal to "interject" itself into the process, prior to a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding, upon plaintiffs' opportunities to make their case in legislative fora
and the prudential advantages of avoiding "needless friction" between Con-
gress and the judiciary. Id. at 753-54.
244. Sanders, 463 F.2d at 900.
245. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691-92. The Court permitted President Nixon to
challenge the subpoena duces tecum via immediate appeal rather than impos-
ing the typical procedure requiring the President to disobey the subpoena and,
subsequently, assert his constitutional arguments as a defense in a criminal
contempt proceeding. Id. at 686-87.
246. 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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dispute by holding an executive officer in contempt and, at the
same time, bar judicial review by indefinitely delaying a full
House vote.247 Courts have and should apply principles of pru-
dence in deciding whether a dispute has ripened to the point
where the issues are crystallized and the procedure poses an
imminent threat to the constitutional structure of power.248
Judicial participation in resolving document disputes will
not result in a proliferation of illegitimate executive privilege
claims. The executive still will have to anticipate that any re-
sistance to full disclosure will be perceived by many individu-
als in government, the media, and the public as inherently
suspect. Furthermore, if the executive loses in federal court
and must produce the documents, the executive would prefer
that the materials be viewed by an objective observer as plau-
sibly privileged in hindsight, rather than suffer the embar-
rassment and political injury that is sure to accompany a bogus
assertion of privilege. However, at least the executive's claim
of privilege will be taken seriously in a federal court, which,
theoretically, decides cases according to rules of law and con-
stitutional values rather than popular perceptions. National
interests in secrecy will be more carefully considered by a fed-
eral court than by the media (bloodthirsty for scandal) 49 or
247. If a vote from the full House triggered Article Im jurisdiction, Con-
gress could subject the executive branch to the first eight stages of coercive
legislative acts identified at the outset of Part Im of this Article, all the while
eliminating the possibility of judicial arbitration. The effect would be to sub-
stantially diminish the political viability of maintaining an effective assertion
of executive privilege.
248. See, e.g., Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(Leventhal, J., concurring) (noting the wisdom "in avoiding 'needless friction!
with" Congress and "the importance of awaiting a specific impairment or
threatened impairment in order to assure a sure-footed judicial disposition").
Dean Shane doubts that courts would be willing to entertain a declara-
tory judgment action prior to a full House vote, which Dean Shane believes is
"an earlier point than the effective operation of government absolutely re-
quires." Letter from Dean Peter M. Shane to Randall K. Miller (Oct. 1, 1996)(on file with author). I agree with Dean Shane's standard, but would suggest
that, in light of the legal and practical force of a committee subpoena, the ef-
fective operation of government may necessitate adjudication of the informa-
tion dispute prior to a full House vote. Unless Congress were willing to im-
pose a fast-track procedure in cases of executive privilege, requiring a vote of
the full house to occur within a set, short time frame (for example, ten calen-
dar days) after approval of the initial contempt resolution, Congress can allow
the subpoena and committee contempt resolutions to dangle indefinitely, ex-
acting overly-coercive political pressure on the President.
249. The ability to unmask a national scandal can make a journalist's ca-
reer. Two pioneers of modem investigative journalism, Bob Woodward and
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members of Congress (the executive's opponent in the zero-sum
game of document disputes). The federal judiciary, whose
judges enjoy qualities of independence (life tenure and salary
protection),250 is the institution of national government most
capable of standing above partisan warfare and the retributive
ethic of national politics to engage in the admittedly difficult,
subjective, and philosophical task of balancing competing and
legitimate constitutional interests.
The standard of review as first developed in the Water-
gate251 and AT&T252 cases, a functional balancing test, has
Carl Bernstein (or their images as portrayed by Robert Redford and Dustin
Hoffman in the motion picture All the President's Men (Warner Bros., 1976))
are likely to be role models (at least on a subconscious level) to many journal-
ists who cover national politics today. This is not to suggest that journalists
pursue scandal in an unethical fashion or do not believe in uncovering the
truth. It is merely to acknowledge that the Woodward and Bernstein story is
a pop-culture legend, has undoubtedly influenced modern journalism (some
journalists may have decided on their profession partly because of Woodward
and Bernstein), and affects the way journalists (as opposed to constitutional
lawyers) react to executive privilege.
250. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
251. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D.D.C.) (ruling that courts must "weigh the
public interests protected by the President's claim of privilege against the
public interests that would be served by disclosure to the Committee in this
particular instance"), affd by 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (en banc) ("[Aipplication of Ex-
ecutive privilege depends on a weighing of the public interest protected by the
privilege against the public interests that would be served by disclosure in a
particular case.").
In United States v. Nixon, the Court suggested in dicta that a balancing
test would be appropriate in executive-congressional information disputes:
"We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's general-
ized interest in confidentiality ... and congressional demands for informa-
tion," but only with "the conflict between the President's assertion of a gen-
eralized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant
evidence in criminal trials." 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974) (emphasis added).
252. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
To decide this case on the merits, we would be called on to balance
the constitutional interests raised by the parties, including such fac-
tors as the strength of Congress's need for the information in the re-
quest letters, the likelihood of a leak of the information in the Sub-
committee's hands, and the seriousness of the harm to national
security from such a release.
Id.; cf State ex rel. Joint Comm. on Gov't & Fin. of W. Va. Legislature v.
Bonar, 230 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (W. Va. 1976) (applying West Virginia law)
(refusing to enforce a legislative subpoena duces tecum against the Depart-
ment of Public Safety because the state legislature had failed to demonstrate
that the documents were material and relevant to this purpose, and that the
information was not otherwise practically available).
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been reinforced by modern separation of powers jurisprudence
which tends to favor functionalism in the absence of a clear an-
swer from the Constitution's text.25 3 The court would essen-
tially ask whether disclosure of the disputed information
harms the President's ability to perform his constitutional du-
ties more than nondisclosure would harm Congress's ability to
perform its constitutional functions. A court can anticipate
that the parties, having failed to negotiate and desiring to
avoid institutional concessions, will present polar argu-
ments. 4 Achieving an "optimal" balance between these inter-
ests unavoidably will involve some level of subjectivity. A fed-
eral judge will likely have to consider documents, affidavits,
and testimony in camera, a method approved in Nixon. 5 5 In
fashioning the remedy, the federal judge should be flexible and
avoid overly-broad assertions which may unduly influence fu-
ture information negotiations by narrowly tailoring the remedy
to the unique circumstances of the dispute. 6 The judge should
facilitate negotiations and settlement as did the court in
AT&T.257 Federal judges are familiar and skilled at urging
settlement258 and avoiding pronouncement of constitutional
253. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-97 (1989)
(upholding the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sen-
tencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (upholding
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Services., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977) (upholding the Presidential Records and
Materials Preservation Act because the Act is not "unduly disruptive of the
Executive Branch"); cf Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that formalism
should be applied "[wihere a power has been committed to a particular branch
of the Government in the text of the Constitution... [i.e.,] where the Consti-
tution draws a clear line").
254. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT ON THE BURFORD CONTROVERSY, supra note
65, at 27-82 (documenting broad assertions by Congress that it was entitled to
review EPA documents relating to environmental enforcement litigation, and
similarly broad assertions by the executive branch that it was privileged to
withhold such documents, in correspondence between the two branches).
255. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
256. Miller, supra note 207, at 801-02. It is neither possible nor desirable
for federal courts to establish rules of law with an eye toward future disputes.
For example, in a close case, should a court defer to Congress as the
(arguably) more democratic institution? Or should it defer to the executive
branch's "expertise" or the fact that the President represents a national con-
stituency? These abstractions cannot be liberated from the specific factual
context.
257. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text (discussing steps
taken by the court in AT&T to nudge the parties toward resolution).
258. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d
339, 350 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing "the value and necessity of a vigorous
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rules beyond that required by the particular facts before the
court." 9 If a decision is necessary, the judge is not required to
pronounce total victory for either side; rather, the judge should
consider intermediate positions, such as allowing the executive
to delay production of documents pending an executive branch
decision or ordering the executive to produce document sum-
maries and/or indices, representative samples, redacted docu-
ments, or a combination of these. The court could also allow
committee members to view the documents but forbid members
from obtaining physical custody of materials or taking notes.
260
While this last option ostensibly accommodates executive
branch interests, in reality it fails to keep the "cat in the
bag."261 Members of Congress will know the contents of the
documents and cannot be prevented, consistent with the
Speech or Debate Clause,262 from reporting their knowledge be-
policy of encouraging fair and reasonable settlement of civil claims whenever
possible" and that "an activist role for judges in managing cases-and en-
couraging their settlement-has expressly been provided for under the federal
rules"); Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settle-
ments, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (1983-1984) (describing tactics judges use
to settle cases).
259. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the Court will neither "anticipate
a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it" nor
"formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied").
260. Cf. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d at 386 (describing the agree-
ment between the branches using redacted documents and random-sample
verification procedures); Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge, supra note 12, at
218-19 ("The Executive may release the material requested, but under pro-
tective conditions ranging from Congress's promise to maintain confidentiality
for the information it obtains to congressional inspection of material while it
remains in executive custody."). Shane also outlines three other intermediate
options: (1) delay production pending completion of the executive process; (2)
release redacted documents; and (3) release summaries. Id.
261. As suggested earlier, allowing access to the requested documents via
a secured viewing procedure is generally interpreted as a victory for Congress.
Commenting on the secured viewing procedures agreed upon after the EPA
document dispute, Rep. James H. Scheuer, chair of one of the investigating
committees, stated: "This charade was designed as a face-saver for the presi-
dent to get him off the sticky wicket of insisting on executive privilege. We
have to go through this little dog-and-pony show to get to the unexpurgated,
unedited documents." Howard Kurtz, Levitas Pact on EPA Documents
Faulted By Panel Chairman, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1983, at Al.
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court
has held that the Speech or Debate Clause provides absolute immunity to
members of Congress and their aids for legislative acts. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 443 U.S. 111, 112 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 606
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972).
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fore the C-Span cameras. Once a secret has escaped, damage
to national interests may be irreparable.
Executive privilege can and has been abused. However,
the executive branch does not have a monopoly on the abuse of
power. Neither of the political branches is immune from cor-
ruption. Both branches have legitimate constitutional inter-
ests to champion. It is unfair to compare members of congres-
sional investigating committees to the worst image of Joseph
McCarthy; however, it is equally unfair to compare every
president who asserts executive privilege to the worst image of
Richard Nixon. To assure that the national powers are appro-
priately balanced, a fair and neutral mechanism to police the
boundaries of power must be followed. Judicial abdication and
political negotiation have failed to safeguard important execu-
tive prerogatives. Federal courts must therefore intervene to
reestablish the equilibrium required by the Constitution be-
tween the President and Congress and check excesses that po-
tentially emanate from both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
The potential for vindication in federal court may liberate
presidents from the popular presumption of Watergate guilt
and enable them to assert executive privilege without penalty
when the national interest so requires.263
C. IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATION
Should a federal court assert jurisdiction over an executive
privilege-congressional oversight battle the court may confront
the ever-increasing presence of the Independent Counsel. In
such cases, the court should ask, to what extent does an Inde-
pendent Counsel investigation limit the scope of overlapping
congressional inquiry? In 1957, the Supreme Court stated that
one of Congress's constitutional functions, which substantiates
its investigation and subpoena authority, is to expose
"corruption, inefficiency or waste" in government.26 However,
since the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act,265 Inde-
263. To be fair, there is much truth to Raoul Berger's observation that the
executive branch is institutionally infatuated with secrecy. Raoul Berger, Ex-
ecutive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry (Part II), 12 UCLA L. REV. 1288,
1295 n.414 (1965). One can imagine the theoretical dangers of a politically
strong president cloaking in privilege far more information than the execution
of his duties require, rendering Congress too ill-informed to craft wise legisla-
tion or guard against autocracy. This Article has focused on an imbalance of
power in favor of Congress, which has characterized the post-Watergate era.
264. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994).
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pendent Counsel have been probing "corruption, inefficiency or
waste" and possible criminal conduct through investigations
that overlap and duplicate congressional investigations. The
purposes of the investigations are ostensibly distinct: an Inde-
pendent Counsel is investigating criminal conduct and seeking
grand jury indictments and prosecutions if necessary; a con-
gressional committee theoretically has a legislative goal.
While some commentators are optimistic that the two proc-
esses can work well together,266 simultaneous investigations
pose potential problems. 267
First, it may be unfair to the subject of an investigation to
respond to duplicative inquiries. As Lloyd Cutler has argued,
"[O]ne inevitable consequence of the appointment of a Special
Prosecutor or Independent Counsel is a repetition of going over
ground that has already been gone over, and a very substantial
increase in the amount of time the target and his lawyer must
spend on the matter."2 68 Second, as the North269 and Poindex-
ter270 cases demonstrate, a congressional committee which be-
stows immunity on a witness in order to overcome the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination and coerce
testimony may effectively nullify any possible criminal prose-
cution of that witness.271  Third, duplicative investigations
266. See, e.g., John Van Loben Sels, Note, From Watergate to Whitewater:
Congressional Use Immunity and Its Impact on the Independent Counsel, 83
GEo. L.J. 2385, 2388 (1995) ("Through diligent efforts and policies of reason-
able accommodation, Congress and the Independent Counsel can resolve most
conflicts between them without the high social costs of lost prosecutions and
without undue delays in informing the American public about the conduct of
its government officials.").
267. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Walsh, Political Oversight, The Rule of Law,
and Iran-Contra, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 587, 593-94 (1994) (describing how the
grant of congressional immunity to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and
Admiral John Poindexter prevented successful prosecution of those two fig-
ures by the Independent Counsel).
268. S. REP. No. 97-496, at 18-19 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3537, 3554-55 (statement of Lloyd Cutler).
269. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
270. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
271. The North and Poindexter cases placed a heavy burden on the gov-
ernment to show that its evidence was not tainted by the immunized testi-
mony, but that the case in chief stands on sources independent of the testi-
mony. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 373-77; North, 920 F.2d at 942-47. As one
commentator noted: "Practical considerations of cost, scarce resources, and
the strict prosecutorial requirements of the (North and Poindexter] opinions
dictate that an Independent Counsel will almost never be able to prosecute a
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could thwart the fact-finding process itself. Public testimony
elicited by Congress from one witness "would allow other wit-
nesses to revise their own testimony in light of the new infor-
mation."272  In addition, congressional interaction with wit-
nesses threatens to distort the witnesses' recollections.273
Fourth, as the court held in Senate Select Committee v.
Nixon,274 Congress may not subpoena materials if disclosure of
witness successfully after he testifies publicly under immunity before Con-
gress." Van Loben Sels, supra note 266, at 2387.
An argument could be made that Congress has the prerogative to choose
to forego a criminal prosecution in order to pursue a congressional investiga-
tion that Congress knows will taint the subsequent prosecution. In the North
and Poindexter cases, however, this was an unintended consequence, not a
conscious choice. Moreover, deciding which laws to enforce and which indi-
viduals to prosecute is an executive function and this allocation of power may
limit Congress's ability to unilaterally decide to scuttle a prosecution. Simi-
larly, Congress may not, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, damage the
defense of a criminal prosecution by undermining the fact-finding process and
generating undue pre-trial publicity.
On June 12, 1996, Democrats on the Senate Whitewater Committee
blocked Republican attempts to give David Hale immunity for his testimony.
Senate Whitewater Hearings (C-Span television broadcast, June 12, 1996).
Mr. Hale is a former Arkansas judge who allegedly was pressured by then-
Governor Clinton into making an illegal loan. Id. He was subpoenaed to ap-
pear before the Committee but indicated in a letter to the Committee that he
would assert his Fifth Amendment rights and would not testify unless he was
given immunity. On the surface, the debate regarding Hale's immunity posed
the issue of whether those who face criminal liability should be able to escape
justice by offering testimony to Congress. For example, Senator John F.
Kerry said he was "not willing to reward a scum bag [Hale] who has already
violated the law and admitted he's a liar." Id. Senator Kerry viewed Mr.
Hale's quest for immunity as an attempt to manipulate the Committee into
aiding his escape from judgment for other crimes he may have committed in
Arkansas. Id.
Political realism suggests that Senator Kerry's position may have had as
much to do with protecting President Clinton from further political embar-
rassment as with assuring that Mr. Hale was brought to justice. Similarly,
the Republicans, motivated at least in part by a desire to injure President
Clinton politically, wanted Mr. Hale to appear before the television cameras to
repeat his allegations of wrongdoing against President Clinton. The rhetoric
focused on the American public's right to justice (Democrats) and right to the
truth (Republicans). The simultaneous partisan intentions of the participants
were transparent. The result: a straight party line vote failing to achieve the
supermajority necessary to grant immunity. Id. I make these observations to
highlight again the partisan ethic of congressional investigations which target
administrations of the other party.
272. Ronald F. Wright, Congressional Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-
Contra, 80 MINN. L. REV. 407,410 (1995).
273. Id.
274. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
370 F. Supp. 521, 522-24 (D.D.C.), affd on other grounds, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
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information to a congressional committee would bias an on-
going criminal prosecution.275 Once a criminal investigation
has been initiated and a target's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights are potentially implicated, a congressional investigation
may not proceed in a way that would dilute an individual's
right to due process or a fair trial. Finally, duplicative investi-
gations are wasteful of scarce public resources.
Because a federal court will employ a functional balancing
test in resolving executive privilege-congressional subpoena
disputes, the above factors tend to militate in favor of sustain-
ing a claim of executive privilege in cases where an Independ-
ent Counsel has been appointed and the objective of a congres-
sional committee is to expose executive branch wrongdoing. In
such cases, the legislative and Independent Counsel objectives
are parallel. A congressional committee may have to wait at
least until the Independent Counsel has had an opportunity to
make its initial determination of whether an indictment will be
pursued. This is not to suggest a per se rule but merely a fac-
tor in the balance. A congressional committee may still be able
to require disclosure notwithstanding the appointment of an
Independent Counsel if, for example, the sought-after docu-
ments were needed to achieve a legislative objective unrelated
to exposing misconduct.276 The President lacks the constitu-
275. Id. at 524. The district court stated:
The Court recognizes that any effort to balance conflicting claims as
to what is in the public interest can provide only an uncertain result,
for ours is a country that thrives and benefits from factional disa-
greements as to what is best for everyone. In assigning priority to
the integrity of criminal justice, the Court believes that it has given
proper weight to what is a dominant and pervasive theme in our cul-
ture. To be sure, the truth can only emerge from full disclosure. A
country's quality is best measured by the integrity of its judicial proc-
esses. Experience and tradition teach that facts surrounding allega-
tions of criminal conduct should be developed in an orderly fashion
during adversary proceedings before neutral fact finders, so that not
only the truth but the whole truth emerges and the rights of those
involved are fully protected.
Id.
276. As always, a functional balancing test treats competing constitutional
interests as equivalent, striking the balance based upon the facts and circum-
stances of each case. One can imagine a federal court ordering the production
of documents critical to an urgent legislative objective, for example, to re-
spond to an outbreak of "mad cow" disease, over the objections of a president's
generalized interest in executive-department candor or generalized concern
regarding diplomatic relations with England. At the other extreme, oval office
deliberations regarding a weapons technology breakthrough or troop move-
ments in an ongoing military endeavor should not be disclosed pursuant to a
general subpoena to produce documents upon which legislation might be had.
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tional authority to cloak misconduct by asserting executive
privilege. However, Congress may not argue that rumors or
suspicion of wrongdoing abrogates or dilutes the President's
authority to assert executive privilege. The function of the In-
dependent Counsel is to investigate and separate partisan ru-
mors from indictable offenses. Unless and until such a deter-
mination is made, the executive powers, including executive
privilege, remain potent and enforceable in federal court. 77
When the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson278 applied a
functional separation of powers balancing test and sustained
the Ethics in Government Act, the Court denied that the Act
impermissibly intruded upon executive power by restricting
removal of an Independent Counsel for cause.279 Based on the
same reasoning, a federal court could conclude that some re-
strictions upon congressional access to materials relating to an
ongoing Independent Counsel investigation would not imper-
missibly intrude on congressional power to investigate. The
Ethics in Government Act can be seen, in part, as a delegation
of congressional power to expose corruption in government.280
The ability of either side to articulate urgency or need in particularized terms
will greatly influence the outcome. Competing claims can be tested by in
camera review of the disputed documents.
277. Commentators have suggested that plausible evidence of executive
branch wrongdoing dilutes or eliminates a president's authority to assert ex-
ecutive privilege. See, e.g., Shane, Legal Disagreement, supra note 13, at 484
(stating that executive branch policy requires disclosure if the information is
"probative of official wrongdoing in the executive branch"). However, if pun-
dits or members of Congress determine the existence of such wrongdoing, this
exception would swallow the rule. Presidents face no shortage of partisan
enemies and those who would make unsubstantiated allegations to inflict po-
litical injury.
278. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
279. Id. at 691-93.
280. The Ethics in Government Act has, to some extent, obviated the need
for congressional investigation to counterbalance the executive's inability to
rigorously investigate itself. Unlike Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski during
Watergate, modern Independent Counsels do not bear the structural pres-
sures of being presidential appendages. They are, for example, appointed by a
Special Division of the D.C. Circuit and removable by the Attorney General
only for cause and "not for what led to Archibald Cox's firing, aggressively
doing his job." Address by Kenneth Starr to Oklahoma Bar Ass'n (C-Span
television broadcast, Nov. 28, 1996). Furthermore, like many of their prede-
cessors, Independent Counsels are usually selected from the other political
party to enhance the credibility of the investigation. Id.
Starr's address, in part, was a response to criticisms that partisan moti-
vations have fueled his two-year Whitewater investigation (which has ex-
panded to include the Travel Office firings and the FBI files controversy). As
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This would imply that, at a minimum, congressional entitle-
ment to subpoena documents is weaker when the underlying
legislative purpose overlaps the objectives of an Independent
Counsel's investigation. Whitewater and the Travel Office con-
troversy are appropriate examples. Of course, if Congress
disagrees strongly enough with a federal court order sustaining
an assertion of executive privilege, it may always turn to its
ultimate check on executive branch officials: impeachment.
CONCLUSION
Article II requires that the executive branch enjoy a cer-
tain level of secrecy to ensure that advice to presidents is can-
did and to safeguard military, diplomatic, and law enforcement
endeavors which premature disclosure would compromise.
Article I requires that Congress have broad access to executive
branch information in order to legislate effectively, oversee
federal programs, and expose corruption and waste in govern-
ment. While political accommodation enables each branch to
carry out these constitutional duties in most cases, resolute
conflicts over information are inevitable. When the informa-
tion disputes escalate beyond a subpoena vote and an assertion
of privilege, negotiation and politics cannot adequately safe-
guard the institutional interests at stake, and federal court in-
tervention is warranted.
A ripe, justiciable controversy exists when a congressional
committee has voted to subpoena documents which the execu-
tive branch refuses to produce based on a claim of executive
privilege. In such circumstances, the federal courts must not
abstain and allow Congress effectively to adjudicate the dis-
pute on Capitol Hill or in the media, or label as criminal an as-
sertion of a privilege which the Supreme Court in United
States v. Nixon held to be presumptively valid. These disputes
are appropriately resolved by application in the district court of
a functional balancing test that asks whether the executive in-
terest in secrecy outweighs the congressional interest in disclo-
sure, in terms of fulfilling each branch's constitutional duties.
By asserting the judicial power to strike this delicate balance,
federal courts will preserve those legitimate constitutional in-
terests that post-Watergate presidents cannot preserve for
themselves.
of March 31, 1996, the cost of Mr. Star's investigation has exceeded $23 mil-
lion. Whitewater Tab Tops $23 Million, CHI. TRiB, Oct. 2, 1996, at 4.
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